Last edited Wed Jun 3, 2015, 08:39 AM - Edit history (1)
There's a great deal you don't know about al-Awlaki, and the CIA's motives for killing him, apparently.
The former head of the CIA Bin Laden Unit, Michael Scheuer, admits Al-Awlaki was a US Intel Asset. See video below.
This guy was much more than a propagandist hater. He was a double-agent who played a role in identifying numerous al-Qaeda operatives involved in attacks on the US during the last ten years, before the fact of the attacks -- from the guys who flew Flt. 77 into the Pentagon, to the shoe bomber, to the Ft. Hood shooter, to the Underwear bomber. The only question is how witting his role was as the spider at the center of the CIA (and/or) DIA (and/or) FBI web(s).
Killing him means Anwar al-Awlaki will never talk about what he understood his actual role was. Nor will the kid. Anwar al-Awlaki was far more than a propagandist - AAA was a CIA double-agent.
Al-Awlaki lasted way past his shelf life in the GWOT. But, he was eventually thrown into the cutout bin, and here is why I think they finally did that.
The President was not pleased the Underwear Bomber got as far as the airspace over Detroit on Christmas Day, 2009. Even less so about the publicity attached to the role of others in getting him onto that airplane, leading back to Awlaki (who was also involved in aiding the Flt. 77 hijackers, the Ft Hood shooter, and the Times Square bomber). In the end, al-Awlaki's role as a U.S. agent was all but admitted to by U.S. officials. Here's what Undersecretary of State Patrick Kennedy said in his testimony before a Senate Committee in January 2010:
http://www.state.gov/m/rls/remarks/2010/135865.htm
We will use revocation authority prior to interagency consultation in circumstances where we believe there is an immediate threat. Revocation is an important tool in our border security arsenal. At the same time, expeditious coordination with our national security partners is not to be underestimated. There have been numerous cases where our unilateral and uncoordinated revocation would have disrupted important investigations that were underway by one of our national security partners. They had the individual under investigation and our revocation action would have disclosed the U.S. Governments interest in the individual and ended our colleagues ability to quietly pursue the case and identify terrorists plans and co-conspirators.
So it was in a sense for AAA. The remaining questing is this: did Anwar al-Awlaki become unreliable or simply lose his operational usefulness? That makes his killing seem all the more outrageous.