Daniel Ellsberg: Snowden made the right call when he fled the U.S.

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148. Politics among nations: The struggle for power and peace

In 1939 the Soviet Union attacked Finland. This action confronted
France and Great Britain with two issues, one legal, the other political. Did
that action violate the Covenant of the League of Nations and, if it did,
what countermeasures should France and Great Britain take? The legal
question could easily be answered in the affirmative, for obviously the
Soviet Union had done what was prohibited by the Covenant. The answer
to the political question depends, first, upon the manner in which the
Russian action affected the interests· of France and Great Britain; second,
upon the existing distribution of power between France and Great Britain,
on the one hand, and the Soviet Union and other potentially hostile nations,
especially Germany, on the other; and, third, upon the influence that
the countermeasures were likely to have upon the interests of France and
Great Britain and the future distribution of power. France and Great Britain,
as the leading members of the League of Nations, saw to it that the
Soviet Union was expelled from the League, and they were prevented from
joining Finland in the war against the Soviet Union only by Sweden's
refusal to allow their troops to pass through Swedish territory on their way
to Finland. If this refusal by Sweden had not saved them, France and Great
Britain would shortly have found themselves at war with the Soviet Union
and Germany at the same time.

The policy of France and Great Britain was a classic example of legalism
in that they allowed the answer to the legal question, legitimate within its
sphere, to determine their political actions. Instead of asking both questions,
that of law and that of power, they asked only the question of law;
and the answer they received could have no bearing on the issue that their
very existence might have depended upon.

The second example illustrates the "moralistic approach" to international
politics. It concerns the international status of the Communist government
of China. The rise of that government confronted the Western
world with two issues, one moral, the other political. Were the nature and
policies of that government in accord with the moral principles of the
Western world? Should the Western world deal with such a government?
The answer to the first question could not fail to be in the negative. Yet
it did not follow with necessity that the answer to the second question
should also be in the negative. The standard of thought applied to the first
-the moral-question was simply to test the nature and the policies of the
Communist government of China by the principles of Western morality.
On the other hand, the second-the political-question had to be subjected
to the complicated test of the interests involved and the power
available on either side, and of the bearing of one or the other course of
action upon these interests and power. The application of this test could
well have led to the conclusion that it would be wiser not to deal with the
Communist government of China. To arrive at this conclusion by neglecting
this test altogether and answering the political question in terms of the
moral issue was indeed a classic example of the "moralistic approach" to
international politics.

The third case illustrates strikingly the contrast between realism and the
legalistic-moralistic approach to foreign policy. Great Britain, as one of the
guarantors of the neutrality of Belgium, went to war with Germany in
August 1914 because Germany had violated the neutrality of Belgium. The
British action could be justified either in realistic or legalistic-moralistic
terms. That is to say, one could argue realistically that for centuries it had
been axiomatic for British foreign policy to prevent the control of the Low
Countries by a hostile power. It was then not so much the violation of
Belgium's neutrality per se as the hostile intentions of the violator which
provided the rationale for British intervention. If the violator had been
another nation but Germany, Great Britain might well have refrained from
intervening. This is the position taken by Sir Edward Grey, British Foreign
Secretary during that period. Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs Hardinge
remarked to him in 1908: "If France violated Belgian neutrality in a war
against Germany, it is doubtful whether England or Russia would move
a finger to maintain Belgian neutrality, while if the neutrality of Belgium
was violated by Germany, it is probable that the converse would be the
case." Whereupon Sir Edward Grey replied: "This is to the point." Yet one
could also take the legalistic and moralistic position that the violation of
Belgium's neutrality per se, because of its legal and moral defects and
regardless of the interests at stake and of the identity of the violator,
justified British and, for that matter, American intervention.

Morgenthau, H. (1948). Politics among nations: The struggle for power and peace (pp. 13, 14). New York: Knopf.