If Truman refused to use the atomic bomb on Japan, what should he have done instead?

[LanternWaste]

49. Implicating ethics and morality into conflict is a rather diaphanous baseline

Implicating ethics and morality into conflict is a rather diaphanous baseline. Von Clausewitz wrote in his classic, 'On War', that the only purpose to wage war is to prevent your opponent from being able to wage war, and to render him politically helpless and militarily impotent. If we take that as a truism, it denies any other moral absolutes other than success.

During the Revolutionary War, Britain stated time and time again that the way the colonial forces were fighting were "unfaire, and laking any honors of men", yet the British adopted those same small-piece tactics and put them to efficient use in the Peninsular campaigns of the Napoleonic conflicts in Europe. Ironically, the U.S. cried foul when the North Vietnamese forces did the very same thing in the 1960s. Same tactics, different moralities, hence different ethical judgments.

Stimson (SecNav) was given an analysis (extrapolated from casualty rates from the Philippines campaign through Okinawa) that Operation Downfall would not only result in over one million American casualties (killed, wounded, captured), but up to seven million Japanese casualties also(!). Regardless of the eventual impotence of the Imperial Army, it was still the prime obstacle to overcome. Although hindsight tells us those numbers may have been exaggerated, neither Stimson nor Truman knew this.

So Truman asked himself, "what can we do to bring this war to an end as soon as possible with as few casualties to the Allies as possible?" Drop the bomb.

Which brings us to targeting. After LeMay's 44-45 bomber campaign in the Japanese homeland, there were no real industrial or military targets left, but the Japanese army was still fighting, still defending, and still killing tens of thousands civilians in Asia. So we can presume that the denial of a military/industrial base would not deter Japan from continuing the fight as long as possible. (Also, Japan had been stockpiling it's fuel since being forced out of Manila, and had stopped intercepting the US bombers to preserve its interceptors for they saw as the eventual invasion of the Japanese mainland). Interesting to note is that Kyoto was initially considered a prime target, but Stimson objected due to its cultural importance). During the fire-bombing, and preceding the atomic bombing, the US did in fact, drop millions of leaflets warning the population of impending raids (Japanese authorities arrested any civilian caught with one of the leaflets on their person), the population of Hiroshima was among the recipients of these leaflets mere days prior to the bombing.

In the end, "The goal of the weapon was to convince Japan to surrender unconditionally in accordance with the terms of the Potsdam Declaration..." And historical (rather than editorial) precedence concludes this is what drove the final militant faction of the government (the faction that was in de facto control of the government) to its final surrender.


I say none of this to change your mind, only to allow you access to some information you may not have had prior to this.
Kenneth Nichols, The Road to Trinity; Joseph Persico, Roosevelt's Secret War; and Gruhl Werner's, 'Imperial Japan's World War II' are very, very good sources for some meaty exposition on the moral dilemmas all countries faces in that conflict.