The Cameron Trap: Obama’s Lesson from the British Vote [View all]

[KoKo]

Humiliation is tied to pride. Parliament’s anger had a great deal to do with process; as John Cassidy has written, it took a small rebellion on the part of the public to remind the Prime Minister that he couldn’t just rush off to war, shouting vague explanations over his shoulder as he went. Cameron’s government had first approached Parliament with the sense that the decision had been made, that they were there just to approve, that there was no need to wait for the inspectors, just for the Prime Minister to get off the phone with Obama; in his speech to the House of Commons before the vote, Cameron said that he’d had to explain to Obama why he had even called them back at all. (He said he’d told the President that it was because of “the damage done to public confidence by Iraq.”)

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Cameron’s failure in Parliament makes getting a vote from Congress more necessary—precisely because it might fail. The British vote removes any plausible claim that the Administration can assume consent—that the proper reaction to the horror in Syria is so obvious, so rooted in “norms” that one needn’t even ask. The grounds in international law for military action are shaky, though. Neither the Arab League nor the Security Council are giving legal cover. Now there is not even an ersatz consensus of allies. That isn’t to say that lone, noble stands are never right; but it should preclude a half-thought-out military action with little public support that dodges America’s political processes and institutions.

Cameron, speaking to Parliament, said that bombing Syria wouldn’t be about “taking sides,” or régime change,” or “even about working more closely with the opposition”—just “our response to a war crime—nothing else.” Neither he nor Obama has explained how to enforce that “nothing else” clause. What’s the next step, when Assad reacts, and the next after that? Obama, if anything, was more vague in an interview on PBS:

And if, in fact, we can take limited, tailored approaches, not getting drawn into a long conflict, not a repetition of, you know, Iraq, which I know a lot of people are worried about - but if we are saying in a clear and decisive but very limited way, we send a shot across the bow saying, stop doing this, that can have a positive impact on our national security over the long term, and may have a positive impact on our national security over the long term and may have a positive impact in the sense that chemical weapons are not used again on innocent civilians.

“Tailored approaches” seems to be the new “surgical strikes” (the worst euphemisms are those that involve bombs). As for that “shot across the bow”—where is it meant to land?

Obama may take the British vote as proof that he can’t risk putting himself in Cameron’s position. But facing Congress after things don’t go according to plan—if there even is a plan—would be all the more humiliating. Obama can’t win this the way that Cameron lost it: by talking as though he is the only one acting according to principle, and that those who disagree just haven’t seen enough pictures of the effects of chemical weapons. There are principles at work in wondering whether something that feels satisfying but causes more death and disorder is right, too. The real Cameron trap is thinking that a leader can go to war personally and apolitically, without having a good answer when asked what’s supposed to happen after the missiles are fired. Does the President get that?

http://www.newyorker.com/online/blogs/closeread/2013/08/british-vote-on-syria-obama-lesson.html