JFK Conference: Bill Kelly introduced new evidence - adding Air Force One tape recordings

[Octafish]

91. LeMay was very complicated fellow...a Hero and a Patriot...

...and probably crazy with the knowledge of what he had done. Here's an excellent profile -- hagiography, I think, is the word:

LeMay

Doolittle and Eaker said he was the greatest air commander of all time.

By Walter J. Boyne
Air Force Magazine, March 1998

There has never been anyone like Gen. Curtis E. LeMay. Within the Air Force, he was extraordinarily successful at every level of command, from squadron to the entire service. He was a brilliant pilot, preeminent navigator, and excellent bombardier, as well as a daring combat leader who always flew the toughest missions.

A master of tactics and strategy, LeMay not only played key World War II roles in both Europe and the Pacific but also pushed Strategic Air Command to the pinnacle of greatness and served as the architect of victory in the Cold War. He was the greatest air commander of all time, determined to win as quickly as possible with the minimum number of casualties.

SNIP...

Despite his own inclination to avoid it, LeMay became a celebrity as SAC's commander, in small part because he continued flying and setting records. More than anything else, it is important to emphasize that LeMay had been a simple good soldier at SAC. Recent sensationalist television presentations and revisionist articles have claimed that he authorized, on his own, provocative overflights of the Soviet Union. They have alleged that his intentions were to acquire justification for launching a preemptive nuclear strike. These claims are totally false, fabrications made up from partial truths, comments taken out of context, and-on occasion-deliberately literal interpretations of obviously sarcastic remarks.

SNIP...

LeMay found himself caught in an impossible situation when he became Chief on June 30, 1961, for he did not understand his leaders and they did not appreciate his experience as a warrior. The new civilian authority, led by President John F. Kennedy and Defense Secretary Robert S. McNamara, adopted a policy of "flexible response" advocated by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Army Gen. Maxwell D. Taylor.

To a significant degree, flexible response led the US into a ground war in Southeast Asia; it made no sense to LeMay. His advice on not entering combat in Southeast Asia was ignored, and most galling of all, once combat began, his advice on how to win the war was ignored as well. Later, he noted that the US dropped 502,000 tons of bombs on Japan and won the war. In Southeast Asia, the US dropped 6,162,000 tons of bombs (mostly on our ally, South Vietnam) and lost the war.

The difference was that in Japan, LeMay chose the targets, and in Vietnam, McNamara and President Lyndon B. Johnson did.

His inability to deal with the Kennedy and Johnson administrations filled his years as Chief with frustration. LeMay believed in civilian control but also believed that civilian control of the military implicitly required careful consideration of the military's advice on military matters. He particularly resented McNamara's continual use of "military" rationale to explain decisions that he made based only on quantitative analysis.

SNIP...

Gen. David Jones, former USAF Chief of Staff and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, was once LeMay's aide and pilot. He has related how, many years later, in Orlando, Fla., in a gathering of retired generals, LeMay was asked why he had run with Wallace. LeMay was silent, then replied that he despised Wallace's policies and would never have run with him if he thought he had a chance at winning. He did, however, believe that the Democratic nominee for President, Hubert Humphrey, would be disastrous for the country's defenses if elected. Thus, according to LeMay, he ran with Wallace, against all his desires, simply to help take votes away from Humphrey.

CONTINUED...

http://www.airforcemag.com/MagazineArchive/Pages/1998/March%201998/0398lemay.aspx

So, the idea of him going against his civilian commander-in-chief is pretty revolting. The thing is, what was LeMay hearing from the others at the top of the secret heap? That Kennedy was a commie? A sexual deviant? A drug user? We don't know. We do know that some at the top of the secret heap have done a lot to obstruct justice. We also know LeMay did not care for leadership as envisioned by Liberal Democrats.