The holding of the case is that the FCC, as an administrative body, has complete discretion to determine whether service providers are "information services" or "telecommunications services" because the definitions accorded to each in the telecom acts leave room for the agency, in the reasonable exercise of its authority, to fill in the statutory gaps and make a decision, without interference from the courts.
The result, in this particular instance, was that the FCC's decision to classify cable broadband as an "information service" was allowed to stand without judicial scrutiny by the Court. However, Stevens' concurrence makes clear that an opposite decision by the FCC (i.e., classification as a "telecommunications service"
would be just as kosher, for the same reason. The Court does not evaluate the substantive question of whether cable broadband actually IS an "information service" except to the extent it finds no evidence that the FCC's decision directly contradicts what's written in the statute. That's the whole point: the Court is saying that under current law, courts have no place to question the FCC's classification either way.
Chevron is cited in support of courts deferring to administrative bodies' rule-making authority in the absence of any clear violation of statute. It has absolutely nothing to do with the FCC's internal decision-making process, Declaratory Ruling 4823, etc. It was not cited in support of the FCC's actual classification of cable broadband as an "information service", but rather in support of leaving the classification alone.
By the way, I read from the actual decision but provided the brief as a courtesy.
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