Justice Antonin Scalia: Constitution allows religion to be favored over secularism

[Fortinbras Armstrong]

68. He claims to support original intent

But is only when it suits him. For those one or two of you asking "What is original intent", Original intent, AKA "originalism", is a school of Constitutional interpretation that insists it should only be interpreted as the originalists suspect the original writers had in mind. There are a number of problems with originalism, starting with the fact that many of the framers of the Constitution disagreed with other framers. Another problem is determining the intent of the framers. But the major problem was expressed by Thomas Jefferson

Some men look at constitutions with sanctimonious reverence, and deem them like the ark of the Covenant, too sacred to be touched. They ascribe to the men of the preceding age a wisdom more than human, and suppose what they did to be beyond amendment... laws and institutions must go hand in hand with the progress of the human mind... as that becomes more developed, more enlightened, as new discoveries are made, institutions must advance also, to keep pace with the times.... We might as well require a man to wear still the coat which fitted him when a boy as civilized society to remain forever under the regimen of their barbarous ancestors.

In other words, what makes the intent of the framers so sacrosanct?

Anyway, in the case of Gonzales v Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005), Angel Raich was growing marijuana for her own medicinal use -- which was legal under California law. The Supreme Court, in a 6-3 decision, held this to be illegal under Federal law. A concurring opinion was written by Scalia, who based the decision ultimately under the Interstate Commerce clause of the Constitution and the Necessary and Proper Clause, saying

Unlike the power to regulate activities that have a substantial effect on interstate commerce, the power to enact laws enabling effective regulation of interstate commerce can only be exercised in conjunction with congressional regulation of an interstate market, and it extends only to those measures necessary to make the interstate regulation effective. As <US v Lopez, 514 US 549 (1995)> itself states, and the Court affirms today, Congress may regulate noneconomic intrastate activities only where the failure to do so “could ... undercut” its regulation of interstate commerce. ... This is not a power that threatens to obliterate the line between “what is truly national and what is truly local.

Interestingly enough, Justice O'Connor based her dissent on exactly the same case Scalia based his concurrance, Lopez. She said that Lopez placed limits on Federal use of the Interstate Commerce clause and Raich's use of marijuana came under those limits.

Clarence Thomas, of all people, said that the majority was wrong, saying that Raich grew and used

Marijuana that has never been bought or sold, that has never crossed state lines, and that has had no demonstrable effect on the national market for marijuana. If Congress can regulate this under the Commerce Clause, then it can regulate virtually anything--and the Federal government is no longer one of limited and enumerated powers. ... By holding that Congress may regulate activity that is neither interstate nor commerce under the Interstate Commerce Clause, the Court abandons any attempt to enforce the Constitution's limits on federal power.

Thomas wrote: "The Necessary and Proper Clause is not a warrant to Congress to enact any law that bears some conceivable connection to the exercise of an enumerated power". He went on to say "Congress presented no evidence in support of its conclusions, which are not so much findings of fact as assertions of power," and concluded: "Congress cannot define the scope of its own power merely by declaring the necessity of its enactments".

The gist of Thomas' dissent comes straight out of original intent:

Respondent's local cultivation and consumption of marijuana is not "Commerce ... among the several States". Certainly no evidence from the founding suggests that "commerce" included the mere possession of a good or some personal activity that did not involve trade or exchange for value. In the early days of the Republic, it would have been unthinkable that Congress could prohibit the local cultivation, possession, and consumption of marijuana.

I believe that here, Thomas is quite right, and Scalia only really supports "original intent" when he agrees with it.