The CDC's big mistake re: Vinson's flight was its reaction to the media

[Yo_Mama]

44. I happen to agree with you

But neither of us was involved in the decision-making process.

I don't think she should have been on that flight. I think the proper procedure would have been to direct her to a well-equpped hospital locally, warn the hospital, and then hold her in isolation until she got the WHO-recommended two negative tests 48 hours apart. Which she would not have gotten. Once the first nurse was known positive, that was, to my mind, the only possible correct procedure.

I have, and a lot of people have, been agitating for a slightly more serious standard since early September, long before Mr. Duncan ever showed up at that hospital.

In late August, CDC revealed that they had had 57 or 58 requests for Ebola testing and that they had actually tested only 7 or eight times. So, I just don't want to hear the nurse blamed for this. It is not at all clear to me that if the nurse had gone to a local hospital that the CDC would have tested her. They might have told her just to go, and then I guess she could have hung out at a local motel until she got really sick.

Maybe a state authority would have argued it out and gotten a test, but her symptoms were unclear and doctors have been asking for tests and not getting them, so to me this is just one more in the long line of "mistakes will happen". It could have happened long before now.

Here is the current CDC guidance from their website. Note that there is no monitoring recommendation whatsoever for HCW who were exposed to patients while wearing PPE:
http://www.cdc.gov/vhf/ebola/hcp/infection-prevention-and-control-recommendations.html

HCP who develop sudden onset of fever, intense weakness or muscle pains, vomiting, diarrhea, or any signs of hemorrhage after an unprotected exposure (i.e. not wearing recommended PPE at the time of patient contact or through direct contact to blood or body fluids) to a patient with EVD should

Not report to work or should immediately stop working
Notify their supervisor
Seek prompt medical evaluation and testing
Notify local and state health departments
Comply with work exclusion until they are deemed no longer infectious to others

For asymptomatic HCP who had an unprotected exposure (i.e. not wearing recommended PPE at the time of patient contact or through direct contact to blood or body fluids) to a patient with Ebola HF

Should receive medical evaluation and follow-up care including fever monitoring twice daily for 21 days after the last known exposure.
Hospitals should consider policies ensuring twice daily contact with exposed personnel to discuss potential symptoms and document fever checks
May continue to work while receiving twice daily fever checks, based upon hospital policy and discussion with local, state, and federal public health authorities.

That is all. She did not even fall into that last risk category. She was considered extremely low-risk, and was indeed qualified to fly under CDC guidelines.