Fukushima Daiichi: It May Be Too Late Unless the Military Steps In

[djysrv]

47. what the hydrogen explosiosn did and didn't do

The hydrogen explosions heavily damaged the exterior containment buildings, which were steel and concrete industrial structures that covered the following safety related systems inside. These systems include the reactor pressure vessel, the reactor containment protection the is built around the RPV, the spent fuel pool, and the steam generator. However, what we know so far is that most of the visible damage is to the non-safety related exterior structure.

What gets people concerned is the spectacular visuals of the damage to the exterior of the buidling.

I wrote a summary of a report, cited 0below, whcih lists some of the more significant issues that have been identified by TEPCO and international agencies and firms helping with the decommissioning of the site.

http://theenergycollective.com/dan-yurman/73454/details-emerge-about-failures-fukushima

It is clear that TEPCO's operations resulted in many mistakes which made the situation worse.

In working through the issue of safety decommissioning the site, one of the early priorities is to get control the radioactive water which is in the various buildings and utility subterranean areas around them.

As far as the spent fuel is concerned, TEPCO is building a cover building over the damaged reactor structures to install equipment that will move it from wet to dry storage.

Here's an April 23, 2012 update with more details

http://safetyfirst.nei.org/japan/tepco-building-structure-to-protect-fukushima-daiichi-reactor-4-used-fuel-storage-pool/