Rosia Montana, an omen for TTIP

[magical thyme]

30. like hell they don't.

And no, not just "anybody" can sit on a tribunal. They are, specifically, corporate attorneys.

Plus the numbers of suits countries have been forced to defend themselves against have skyrocketed in recent years. Defending yourself against a lawsuit is expensive.

So governments that are afraid of the lawsuits are encouraged to roll over and change laws that were enacted to protect people and the environment in order to prevent expensive, ruinous lawsuits.

You're the one who doesn't do research and needs to "look it up."

http://www.citizen.org/documents/egregious-investor-state-attacks-case-studies.pdf
The tribunals deciding these cases are composed of three private attorneys, unaccountable to any electorate. Some attorneys rotate between serving as “judges” and bringing cases for corporations against governments – such dual roles would be deemed unethical in most legal systems. Tribunals are not bound by precedent or the opinions of States, and their rulings cannot be appealed on the merits.

ISDS-enforced pacts provide foreign corporations broad substantive “rights” that even surpass the strong property rights afforded to domestic firms in nations such as the United States. This includes the “right” to a regulatory framework that conforms to foreign investors’ “expectations,” which ISDS tribunals have interpreted to mean that governments should not change regulatory policies once a foreign investment has been established.1

Claiming such expansive rights, foreign corporations have used ISDS to attack an increasingly wide array of tobacco, climate, financial, mining, medicine, energy, pollution, water, labor, toxins, development and other non-trade domestic policies. The number of such cases has been soaring. While treaties with ISDS provisions have existed since the 1960s, just 50 known ISDS cases were launched in the regime’s first three decades combined.2 In contrast, corporations launched at least 50 cases each year from 2011-2013 (and 42 in 2014).3

http://www.citizen.org/documents/egregious-investor-state-attacks-case-studies.pdf

Environment: Climate Change
Vattenfall v. Germany I (coal-fired electric plant/climate change), settled (environmental conditions rolled back)Vattenfall, a Swedish energy firm, launched a $1.9 billion investor-state claim against Germany in 2009 under the Energy Charter Treaty over permits delays for a coal-fired power plant in Hamburg.33 According to Vattenfall, delays of required government permits started when the state’s environmental ministry established “very clear requirements” for the plant, due to “the reports of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change having alerted the public to the impending climate change.”34 Public opposition to the proposed plant focused on prospective carbon emissions and water pollution. Further delays, according to Vattenfall, occurred when the Green Party – which opposed the plant on environmental grounds – formed a coalition with the Christian Democrats after state elections in 2008. After Vattenfall litigated in domestic courts, the coalition government issued the permits to Vattenfall, but with additional requirements to protect the Elbe River.35
Rather than comply with these requirements, Vattenfall launched its investor-state claim against Germany, arguing that Hamburg’s environmental rules amounted to an expropriation and a violation of Germany’s obligation to afford foreign investors “fair and equitable treatment.”36

Occidental Petroleum v. Ecuador (oil concession), investor win (awarded $2.3 billion)
In 2006, Occidental Petroleum Corporation (Oxy) launched a claim against Ecuador under the U.S.-Ecuador BIT after the government terminated an oil concession due to the U.S. oil corporation’s breach of the contract and Ecuadorian law.48 Oxy illegally sold 40 percent of its production rights to another firm without government approval, despite a provision in the concession contract stating that sale of Oxy’s production rights without government pre-approval would terminate the contract.49 The contract explicitly enforced Ecuador’s hydrocarbons law, which protects the government’s prerogative to vet companies seeking to produce oil in its territory – a particular concern in the environmentally sensitive Amazon region where Oxy was operating.50 Oxy launched its BIT claim two days after the Ecuadorian government terminated the oil concession, claiming that the government’s enforcement of the contract terms and hydrocarbons law violated its BIT commitments, including the obligation to provide the firm “fair and equitable treatment.”51

Metalclad v. Mexico (toxic waste), investor win (awarded $16.2 million)
In 1997 Metalclad Corporation, a U.S. waste management firm, launched a NAFTA investor-state dispute against Mexico over the decision of Guadalcazar,84 a Mexican municipality, not to grant a construction permit for expansion of a toxic waste facility amid concerns of water contamination and other environmental and health hazards.85 Studies indicated that the site’s soils were very unstable, which could permit toxic waste to infiltrate the subsoil and carry contamination via deeper water sources.86 The local government had already denied similar permits to the Mexican firm from which Metalclad acquired the facility.87 Metalclad argued that the decision to deny a permit to it, as a foreign investor operating under NAFTA’s investor rights, amounted to expropriation without compensation, and a denial of NAFTA’s guarantee of “fair and equitable treatment.”88

S.D. Myers v. Canada (toxic waste), investor win (awarded $5.6 million)
In 1998 S.D. Myers, a U.S. waste treatment company, launched a NAFTA investor-state challenge against a temporary Canadian ban on the export of a hazardous waste called polychlorinated biphenyls (PCB).95 Canada banned exports of toxic waste to the United States absent explicit permission from the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency. And, as a signatory to the Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and their Disposal, Canadian policy generally limited exports of toxic waste.96 Meanwhile, the U.S. Toxic Substances Control Act banned imports of hazardous waste, with limited exceptions such as waste from U.S. military bases.97 The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency has determined that PCBs are harmful to humans and toxic to the environment.98 However, in 1995 the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency decided to allow S.D. Myers and nine other companies to import PCBs into the United States for processing and disposal.99 Canada issued a temporary ban on PCB shipment, seeking to review the conflicting laws and regulations and its obligations under the Basel Convention.100 S.D. Myers argued that the Canadian ban constituted “disguised discrimination,” was “tantamount to an expropriation” and violated NAFTA’s prohibition of performance requirements and obligation to afford a “minimum standard of treatment.”101

Abengoa v. Mexico (toxic waste), investor win (awarded $40 million plus interest)In December 2009, Abengoa, a Spanish technology firm, filed a claim against Mexico under the Spain-Mexico BIT for preventing the company from operating a waste management facility that the local community of Zimapan strongly opposed on environmental grounds.104 The plant was to be built on a geological fault line across from a dam and the Sierra Gorda biosphere reserve – an UNESCO World Heritage site and home to Nanhu and Otomi indigenous communities. The region was already contaminated with arsenic from previous mining operations. The community contended that building a waste facility on a fault line, by a dam, in an area contaminated with arsenic, near indigenous communities and an environmental reserve posed a significant environmental threat.105

Bilcon v. Canada (quarry mining), investor win (award amount pending)In May 2008, members of the U.S.-based Clayton family – the owners of a concrete company – and their U.S. subsidiary, Bilcon of Delaware, launched a NAFTA challenge against Canadian environmental requirements affecting their plans to open a basalt quarry and a marine terminal in Nova Scotia.110 The investors planned to blast, extract and ship out large quantities of basalt from the proposed 152-hectare project,111 located in a key habitat for several endangered species, including oneof the world’s most endangered large whale species.112 Canada’s Department of Fisheries and Oceans determined that blasting and shipping activity in this sensitive area required a rigorous assessment given environmental risks and socioeconomic concerns raised by many members of the local communities.113 A government-convened expert review panel concluded that the project would threaten the local communities’ “core values that reflect their sense of place, their desire for self-reliance, and the need to respect and sustain their surrounding environment.”114 On the recommendation of the panel, the government of Canada rejected the project.115

Financial Stability
Saluka v. Czech Republic (bank bailout), investor win (awarded $236 million)Saluka Investments, a Netherlands investment company, filed an investor-state claim in 2001 under the Netherlands-Czech Republic BIT against the Czech government for not bailing out a private bank, in which the company had a stake, in the same way that the government bailed out banks in which the government had a major stake.129 The bailouts came in response to a widespread bank debt crisis.130 Investicni a Postovni Banka (IPB), the first large bank to be fully privatized in the Czech Republic,131 along with three large banks in which the government retained significant ownership, had been suffering from significant debt and borderline insolvency, threatening the Czech banking sector.132 Consequently, the government placed IPB into forced administration in 2000 and then sold the bank for one crown to another bank.133

CMS Gas v. Argentina (emergency stability measures), investor win (awarded $133 million plus interest)
In July 2001, CMS Gas Transmission Company, a U.S. energy firm, filed a claim against Argentina under the U.S.-Argentina BIT for financial rebalancing policies enacted in response to a 2001 economic meltdown spurring social and political unrest.139 The case particularly targeted the government’s limitations on gas utility rate increases – an effort, as part of Argentina’s Economic Emergency Law, to stem runaway inflation.140

Eureko v. Poland (insurance privatization), settled (investor obtained $1.6 billion)In 2003, Eureko, a Netherlands-based company, filed a claim against Poland under the Netherlands-Poland BIT for prohibiting it from taking a controlling stake in PZU, Poland’s first and largest insurance company.151 Facing significant public and political opposition to a previous administration’s decision to sell a controlling share of Poland’s public insurance firm to a foreign corporation, the Polish government reversed its privatization plans.152

Essential Services
Azurix v. Argentina (water), investor win (awarded $165 million plus interest)
U.S. water company Azurix Corp. (an Enron subsidiary) filed a claim against Argentina under the U.S.-Argentina BIT in 2001 over a dispute related to its controversial water services contract in the province of Buenos Aires.158 During a 1999 water privatization deal, the company won a 30-year concession to provide water and sewage treatment to 2.5 million people.159 Within a few months, residents complained of foul odors coming from the water. Local governments advised against drinking or paying for tap water and street protests against the water service were held.160 After the problem was identified as algae contamination of a reservoir, Azurix alleged the algae was the government’s responsibility and demanded compensation for associated costs.161 The government argued that Azurix had a contractual responsibility to ensure clean drinking water.162 In the following year, residents experienced a series of water outages and were repeatedly over-billed by Azurix for water, resulting in government fines.163 Azurix withdrew from its contract in 2001.164

a lot more at the link...