I Have Yet To Hear A Good Reason Why Iran Would Risk Its Own Destruction By Launching Nukes

[jberryhill]

7. Yes, there could be an irrational belief in counterstrike survival

An acquaintance of mine who spent a number of years maintaining aircraft in Saudi Arabia suggests it is a common belief that an air strike on Mecca, for example, would not be possible, since a divine agency would protect it from attack. Similar beliefs among Iran's leadership may be sincere, and they used similar "spiritual" protection arguments to inspire human wave attacks in the Iran/Iraq conflict. Specifically, they would distribute little plastic "keys to heaven" to the troops, which would gain them access to paradise in the event of death.

Even assuming rationality, I don't think the prospect of allied counterstrike is as credible a threat as it seems. If Iran had the ability to mount an effective first strike launch against Israel, obtaining effectively some measure of complete annihilation, then even if there had been a promise of an allied counterstrike, it would not be rational at that point to actually launch the promised counterstrike.

To put it another way, having threatened an allied counterstrike on Iran, what would be the point of actually doing it if they succeeded in a first strike annihilation of Israel? In the US/USSR context, a counterstrike by the US on the USSR is at least rational to the point of evening the post-exchange political and military balance. Presumably, the point of the USSR strike is to eliminate the US for the purpose of obtaining global domination. But if the US, which can't really be taken out in a first strike, retaliates, then the USSR is still inhibited from the goal of their first strike.

In the allied counterstrike situation, it really comes down to a "revenge" strike more than a "retaliation" strike. An effective counterstrike on Iran would have greater atmospheric consequences, Iran is not going to reach global domination anyway, and the consequences of launching the allied counterstrike are more of a downside for the alliance at that point, since Israel is already gone.


That doesn't mean the allied counterstrike wouldn't be launched, but there is enough reason to doubt the rationality of it, such that it is not as credible a deterrent to a first strike than in the US/USSR context. That doubt is risk.

Plus, there are models in both the 1967 war and the 1972 war. Both of those were imminent existential threats to Israel, and there was no significant intervention by any force allied with Israel.