High Court Rejects Appeal Over Ban on Guns at Post Offices

[friendly_iconoclast]

57. The Supreme Court just *unanimously* issued the following rejection of your thesis:

The disinterested reader will note that there were NO dissents- look up
the definition of 'per curiam'


http://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/15pdf/14-10078_aplc.pdf

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
JAIME CAETANO v. MASSACHUSETTS
ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME
JUDICIAL COURT OF MASSACHUSETTS
No. 14–10078. Decided March 21, 2016

PER CURIAM
.
The Court has held that “the Second Amendment extends,
prima facie, to all instruments that constitute
bearable arms, even those that were not in existence at
the time of the founding,”

District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U. S. 570, 582 (2008),

and that this “Second Amendment right is fully applicable to the States,”

McDonald v. Chicago, 561 U. S. 742, 750 (2010).

In this case, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts upheld a
Massachusetts law prohibiting the possession of stun guns after
examining “whether a stun gun is the type of weapon
contemplated by Congress in 1789 as being protected by
the Second Amendment.”

470 Mass. 774, 777, 26 N. E. 3d 688, 691 (2015).

The court offered three explanations to support its
holding that the Second Amendment does not extend to
stun guns. First, the court explained that stun guns are
not protected because they “were not in common use at the
time of the Second Amendment’s enactment.”

Id., at 781, 26 N. E. 3d, at 693.

This is inconsistent with Heller’s clear statement
that the Second Amendment “extends . . . to . . . arms . . . that were not in existence at the time of the founding.”

554 U. S., at 582.

The court next asked whether stun guns are “dangerous
per se at common law and unusual,”

470 Mass., at 781, 26 N. E. 3d, at 694,
in an attempt to apply one “important
limitation on the right to keep and carry arms,”

Heller 554 U. S., at 627; see ibid. (referring to “the historical
tradition of prohibiting the carrying of ‘dangerous and
unusual weapons’”).

In so doing, the court concluded that stun guns are “unusual”
because they are “a thoroughly modern invention.”

470 Mass., at 781, 26 N. E. 3d, at 693–694.

By equating “unusual” with “in common use at
the time of the Second Amendment’s enactment,” the
court’s second explanation is the same as the first; it is
inconsistent with Heller for the same reason.
Finally, the court used “a contemporary lens” and found
“nothing in the record to suggest that [stun guns] are
readily adaptable to use in the military.”

470 Mass., at 781, 26 N. E. 3d, at 694.

But Heller rejected the proposition “that only those weapons useful in
warfare are protected.”

554 U. S., at 624–625.

For these three reasons, the explanation the Massachusetts court offered
for upholding the law contradicts this
Court’s precedent. Consequently, the petition for a writ of
certiorari and the motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis
are granted. The judgment of the Supreme
Judicial Court of Massachusetts is vacated,
and the case is remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with
this opinion. It is so ordered.