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Blue_Tires

(57,596 posts)
13. If I'm reading this correctly, Stanley Reinartz, Shuttle Project Manager
Tue Feb 7, 2012, 04:17 PM
Feb 2012

The first phase of the teleconference began at 5:45 p. m. Eastern Standard Time; participants included Reinartz, Lovingood, Hardy, and numerous people at Kennedy, Marshall and Thiokol-Wasatch. (Allen McDonald missed this phase; he did not arrive at Kennedy until after 8:00 p.m.) Concerns for the effect of low temperature on the O-rings and the joint seal were presented by Morton Thiokol, along with an opinion that launch should be delayed. A recommendation was also made that Aldrich, Program Manager at Johnson (Level II), be informed of these concerns.

The following are excerpts from testimony before the Commission relating to the teleconference: 8



Dr. Keel: You just indicated earlier that, based upon that teleconference, you thought there was a good possibility of delay. Is that what Thiokol was recommending then, was delay?

Dr. Lovingood: That is the way I heard it, and they were talking about the 51-C experience and the fact that they had experienced the worst case blow-by as far as the arc and the soot and so forth. And also, they talked about the resiliency data that they had.

So it appeared to me-and we didn't have all of the proper people there. That was another aspect of this. It appeared to me that we had better sit down and get the data so that we could understand exactly what they were talking about and assess that data.

And that is why I suggested that we go ahead and have a telecon within the center, so that we could review that.

Dr. Keel: So as early as after that first afternoon conference at 5:45, it appeared that Thiokol was basically saying delay. Is that right?

Dr. Lovingood: That is the way it came across to me. I don't know how other people perceived it, but that's the way it came across to me.

Dr. Keel: Mr. Reinartz, how did you perceive It?

Mr. Reinartz: I did not perceive it that way. I perceived that they were raising some questions and issues which required looking into by all the right parties, but I did not perceive it as a recommendation delay.

Dr. Keel: Some prospects for delay?

Mr. Reinartz: Yes, sir, that possibility is always there.

Dr. Keel: Did you convey that to Mr. Mulloy and Mr. Hardy before the 8:15 conference?

Mr. Reinartz: Yes, I did. And as a matter of fact, we had a discussion. Mr. Mulloy was just out of communication for about an hour, and then after that I got in contact with him, and we both had a short discussion relating to the general nature of the concerns with Dr. Lucas and Mr. Kingsbury at the motel before we both departed for the telecon that we had set up out at the Cape.

Dr. Keel: But based upon that, Mr. Lovingood, that impression, you thought it was a significant enough possibility that Mr. Aldrich should have been contacted?

Dr. Lovingood: Yes.

Dr. Keel: In addition, did you recommend that Mr. Lucas, who is director of Marshall, of course, and Mr. Kingsbury, who is Mr. Hardy's boss, participate in the 8:15 conference?

Dr. Lovingood: Yes, I did.

Dr. Keel: And you recommended that to whom?

Dr. Lovingood: I believe I said that over the net. I said that I thought we ought to have an inter-center meeting involving Dr. Lucas and Mr. Kingsbury, and then plan to go on up the line to Level II and Level I.

And then it was after we broke off that first telecon I called Stan at the motel and told [88] him that he ought to go ahead and alert Arnie to that possibility.

Dr. Keel: And Mr. Reinartz, you then visited the motel room of Mr. Lucas with Mr. Kingsbury, and also was Mr. Mulloy with you then?

Mr. Reinartz: Yes, sir, he was. In the first couple of minutes I believe I was there by myself, and then Mr. Mulloy joined us.

Dr. Keel: And did you discuss with them Mr. Lovingood's recommendation that the two of them, Lucas and Kingsbury, participate?

Mr. Reinartz: No, sir. I don't recall discussing Mr. Lovingood's recommendations. I discussed with them the nature of the telecon, the nature of the concerns raised by Thiokol, and the plans to gather the proper technical support people at Marshall for examination of the data. And I believe that was the essence of the discussion.

Chairman Rogers: But you didn't recommend that the information be given to Level II or Level I?

Mr. Reinartz: I don't recall that I raised that issue with Dr. Lucas. I told him what the plans were for proceeding. I don't recall, Mr. Chairman, making any statement regarding that.

Mr. Hotz: Mr. Reinartz, are you telling us that you in fact are the person who made the decision not to escalate this to a Level II item?

Mr. Reinartz: That is correct, sir.

http://history.nasa.gov/rogersrep/v1ch5.htm

Recommendations

0 members have recommended this reply (displayed in chronological order):

NASA did a horrible, horrible thing, when they refused to listen to him. CaliforniaPeggy Feb 2012 #1
Not just NASA. no_hypocrisy Feb 2012 #11
Thank you for that information. CaliforniaPeggy Feb 2012 #12
Is this just more CT stuff? former9thward Feb 2012 #14
Here's what I could find online. I remember the discussion well in 1986 when it happened. Conceded no_hypocrisy Feb 2012 #21
Don't forget, a phone call doesn't leave a track hedgehog Feb 2012 #32
Well done Kolesar Feb 2012 #50
The launch had been delayed multiple times... Cassandra Feb 2012 #54
Ooooh defense of Reagan. Imagine that! Hassin Bin Sober Feb 2012 #59
Ooooh you building a strawman. Imagine that! former9thward Feb 2012 #60
The Gipper complicit. Tell me it ain't true, Joe indepat Feb 2012 #24
It ain't true, Joe. dairydog91 Feb 2012 #53
It is true. Hermit-The-Prog Jan 2020 #61
I remember that discussion well - BlueMTexpat Feb 2012 #42
See My Post Farther Down ProfessorGAC Feb 2012 #52
If I remember correctly raygun wanted that flight that day madokie Feb 2012 #47
This was not an "engineering miscalculation". This error was a management error. The engineering rhett o rick Feb 2012 #2
yeah, that stuck out for me, too Blue_Tires Feb 2012 #7
The original Hyatt design for the supporting rods was exboyfil Feb 2012 #25
That's a natural corporate media, authoritarian bias coming through in the column. Uncle Joe Feb 2012 #15
The managers were also engineers. eomer Feb 2012 #27
In my book, once you become a manager, you stop being an engineer. nm rhett o rick Feb 2012 #28
Alan McDonald didn't stop being an engineer. Lionel Mandrake Feb 2012 #31
I was generalizing. A problem I see is that when you have engineers as managers rhett o rick Feb 2012 #36
Robert Lund's position at Morton Thiokol was "VP of Engineering". eomer Feb 2012 #43
I agree up to a certain level. However, good engineers dont necessarily rhett o rick Feb 2012 #48
RIP - You DID what you COULD, the shuttle astronauts will tell you that soon,,,,, benld74 Feb 2012 #3
Amen! Boombaby Feb 2012 #5
A man of honour, and a true public servant. PDJane Feb 2012 #4
An Example Of What Happens DallasNE Feb 2012 #6
iirc, there was also a lot of external pressure up top Blue_Tires Feb 2012 #10
A True Engineer burrowowl Feb 2012 #8
Does anyone know who was the on-site asshole that made the final decision to go for launch? denbot Feb 2012 #9
If I'm reading this correctly, Stanley Reinartz, Shuttle Project Manager Blue_Tires Feb 2012 #13
I think I found your answer denbot Lochloosa Feb 2012 #18
RIP Roger and thanks for your service. Uncle Joe Feb 2012 #16
You're welcome. Lionel Mandrake Feb 2012 #26
I was going to watch the launch at home and get to work a little late rocktivity Feb 2012 #17
I thought Reagan's speech on TV that evening was wonderful.... LeftinOH Feb 2012 #19
He died Jan. 6th. Not really LBN tawadi Feb 2012 #20
I remember Richard Feynman absolutely hammering NASA about the o-rings. edbermac Feb 2012 #22
This is a great read slutticus Feb 2012 #23
As I recall, Rogers was upset about that stunt. Lionel Mandrake Feb 2012 #29
Read "The Cognitive Style of PowerPoint" catrose Feb 2012 #30
actually, Tufte's point was that the Powerless Pointless slides failed MadLinguist Feb 2012 #38
It's been awhile since I looked at it catrose Feb 2012 #39
I think it is better for your career to stand by and let bad things happen hedgehog Feb 2012 #33
I attended a communications class that attempted to blame Boisjoly TrogL Feb 2012 #34
CORRECT Skittles Feb 2012 #35
I still remember vividly... sendero Feb 2012 #37
I will never forget that day. It's my birthday. Zoeisright Feb 2012 #40
IIRc, CNN had cut awayt to commercial. I had CNN on but didn't see it live. Hassin Bin Sober Feb 2012 #58
Wow! Read this obit in the LA Times this a.m. & had never heard his story b4-Shocking!!!!!! SoCalDemGrrl Feb 2012 #41
Blessed be the truth-tellers... Surya Gayatri Feb 2012 #44
NASA Was Trying to Go from R&D to Operational Status and Pushed by Reagan to do so solarman350 Feb 2012 #45
Ignore engineers and scientists at your peril malaise Feb 2012 #46
Wow... first I've heard of this. 4_TN_TITANS Feb 2012 #49
I Remember Him ProfessorGAC Feb 2012 #51
''...as the vehicle cleared the tower Bob whispered to me that we had just dodged a bullet.'' Gabi Hayes Feb 2012 #55
IIRC, the plan was to have Reagan talk to the astronauts LIVE from the SOTU, not just mentioning it, GreatCaesarsGhost Feb 2012 #56
Very interesting article obamanut2012 Feb 2012 #57
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