Syria crisis: rebels condemn opposition coalition

[pampango]

26. "1/3 supported Assad, 1/3 supported the rebellion, 1/3 wanted political reform but not a civil war."

So 2/3 of Syrians wanted either Assad gone or a "political reform" (more representative government, less repression?) which Assad could expect would endanger his continued rule or at a minimum reduce his absolute power.

If Assad accepted and his security services accepted that analysis, I can see the wisdom (from Assad's perspective) of the policy pursued. "Political reform" leading to a more representative government and less repression could easily be viewed as dangerous to Assad who is from a minority group in a majority-Sunni country. (Similarly 'political reform' was a dangerous concept to many whites in apartheid South Africa because a more representative government and less repression would likely lead to a non-white majority government.

OTOH, Assad could assess that repressing the rebellion violently, while it might generate outside support for the 1/3 who supported the rebellion, was a better strategy than 'political reform'. The best-case scenario was that his well-armed military would win a quick victory over civilians and defecting soldiers. If the military could not pull that off, but remained loyal to him, and the conflict turned into a protracted civil war, the 1/3 who wanted 'political reform' but not at the expense of a civil war might, reluctantly perhaps, come back and support him.

No one ever accused Assad of not being a smart guy.

"If the Saudis and the Qataris hadn't poured billions into trying to overthrow Assad, there would be no civil war."

That is probably true. In Assad's best-case scenario (above) his military would have triumphed, as his father had done in Hama in 1982, and he could have gone back to being a dictator with no 'political reform'.

Of course, if Russia "hadn't poured billions into trying to ... support ... Assad, there would be no civil war." It has taken his military over 2 years to seemingly get the upper hand over the rebels even with massive military supplies from Moscow. Who knows how this would have played out without that.

"The Gulf Arabs and the West thought they could pull another Libya, and that the Assad regime would crumble."

Perhaps, but at the outset of the Arab Spring 2/3 of Syrians wanted Assad gone or political reforms that might have led to his departure. It sounds like Syrian Arabs thought they could pull another Tunisia or Egypt, as well.

How many dead Syrians will Assad accept to avoid giving up power or accepting political reforms that might lead to a more representative government with less repression (neither of which is conducive to continued Assad family rule of Syria)?