Many will. Maybe most.
Stalin had huge lines of mourners. They cried sincere tears of loss when he died, not because they had a political motivation to do so, not because they were afraid of who'd take over. They were conditioned to trust in him; they believed the propaganda that he was their stalwart, sure defender against hostile forces abroad. They also believed that they were prosperous, better off than those in other countries and better off than they'd have been otherwise, and were grateful for what he'd done and sad that he wouldn't continue to do even more. Yeah, they were partly infantilized, but it's a common enough occurrence. That their great leader had totemic status, so his loss was a loss to the country that went beyond acts and involved symbols was also a large portion of it. Sheer ignorance of many of their "vozhd's" or leader's acts also played a role: If you hear only good things and no bad things, you might assume there were no bad things.
Chavez' calculus is implicit in the communique. What matters is superficial ideology and independence from the great evil one to the--Chavez'--north.
Kim's ideology could be seen as reconciled with Chavez', they had points of similarity. A close (or even less than superficial) analysis would show that there were really big differences. Then you either have to conclude that Chavez wouldn't or couldn't go below a superficial, scant analysis or that there was something more important than actual facts on the ground.
Just as with Ahmedinejad and Assad, opposition to the US covers a multitude of sins. With Chavez it's too consistent to be a one-off kind of lapse. Perhaps this is what made him willing to overlook Kim's lunacy and the gap between what Chavez' and Kim's ideologies. Or perhaps there's less of a gap between Chavez' private ideology and Kim's public one than what Chavez says in public would let us believe.