Glenn Greenwald Calls Obama's NSA Speech A Publicity Stunt

[OnyxCollie]

120. Dismissing as "spinning out" and "catastrophizing"

reveals how little you know about this issue.

The NSA gathered info on Democratic politicians that it would turn over to the FBI and US Attorneys, resulting in investigations and prosecutions, operating under "parallel construction," which would occur during close elections.

ATTORNEY GENERAL JOHN ASHCROFT’S 2002 MEMORANDUM

On March 6, 2002, Attorney General John Ashcroft issued a memorandum regarding new procedures to apply to foreign intelligence (FI) and foreign counterintelligence (FCI) investigations conducted by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). It proposed significant changes to FISA and allowed overlapping between intelligence officers and law enforcement officers:

Prior to the USA Patriot Act, FISA could be used only for the "primary purpose" of obtaining "foreign intelligence information." The term "foreign intelligence information" was and is defined to include information that is necessary, or relevant, to the ability of the United States to protect against foreign threats to national security, such as attack, sabotage, terrorism, or clandestine intelligence activities. See 50 U.S.C. § 1801(e)(1). Under the primary purpose standard, the government could have a significant law enforcement purpose for using FISA, but only if it was subordinate to a primary foreign intelligence purpose. The USA Patriot Act allows FISA to be used for "a significant purpose," rather than the primary purpose, of obtaining foreign intelligence information. Thus, it allows FISA to be used primarily for a law enforcement purpose, as long as a significant foreign intelligence purpose remains. See 50 U.S.C. §§ 1804(a)(7)(B), 1823(a)(7)(B).

The Act also expressly authorizes intelligence officers who are using FISA to "consult" with federal law enforcement officers to "coordinate efforts to investigate or protect against" foreign threats to national security. Under this authority, intelligence and law enforcement officers may exchange a full range of information and advice concerning such efforts in FI or FCI investigations, including information and advice designed to preserve or enhance the possibility of a criminal prosecution. The USA Patriot Act provides that such consultation between intelligence and law enforcement officers "shall not" preclude the government's certification of a significant foreign intelligence purpose or the issuance of a FISA warrant. See 50 U.S.C. §§ 1806(k), 1825(k).


These procedures were changed or rejected by the FISA court and its opinion was publicly released in August 2002.

In spite of the long-accepted, constitutionally sound, independence-preserving method of appointing interim U.S. Attorneys, the appointment process was radically changed with the reauthorization of the USA PATRIOT Act in 2006. Removed was the interbranch appointment from the district court; the Attorney General could now make interim U.S. Attorney appointments. Also eliminated was the 120 day period that interim U.S. Attorneys could stay in office before a district court could appoint an interim U.S. Attorney to fill the vacancy. Interim U.S. Attorneys could now remain in office indefinitely, or until the President appointed a U.S. Attorney to the district. Interim U.S. Attorney appointments bypassed Senate confirmation, leaving the determination of qualification to the Justice Department.

The insertion of this new clause into the reauthorization of the USA PATRIOT Act went unnoticed. Senators were at a loss to explain how the clause made its way into the bill. It was later determined that the Justice Department had requested Brett Tolman to insert the clause into the bill (Kiel, 2007). At the time the clause was inserted Mr. Tolman was a counsel to the Senate Judiciary Committee, of which is Sen. Arlen Specter (R-PA) is a member. Sen. Specter responded to inquiries about his involvement with the clause by saying, “I do not slip things in” (Kiel, 2007, p. 1). According to Sen. Specter, the principal reason for the change was to resolve “separation of power issues” (Kiel, 2007, p. 2). The Senate voted to repeal the clause in February 2007 (P.L. 110-34, 2007). At the time of this writing, Mr. Tolman is a U.S. Attorney for the state of Utah.

~snip~

A report from Professors Emeritus Donald C. Shields and John F. Cragan of the University of Missouri and Illinois State University respectively, shows that of 375 elected officials investigated and/or indicted, 10 involved independents, 67 involved Republicans, and 298 involved Democrats. “U.S. Attorneys across the nation investigate seven times as many Democratic officials as they investigate Republican officials, a number that exceeds even the racial profiling of African Americans in traffic stops” (Shields & Cragan, 2007, p. 1).

Criminal defense lawyers demand access to secret DEA evidence
http://www.rawstory.com/rs/2013/08/08/criminal-defense-lawyers-demand-access-to-secret-dea-evidence/

In interviews, at least a dozen current or former agents said they used “parallel construction,” often by pretending that an investigation began with what appeared to be a routine traffic stop, when the true origin was actually a tip from SOD.

Defense lawyers said that by hiding the existence of the information, the government is violating a defendant’s constitutional right to view potentially exculpatory evidence that suggests witness bias, entrapment or innocence.

“It certainly can’t be that the agents can make up a ‘parallel construction,’ a made-up tale, in court documents, testimony before the grand jury or a judge, without disclosure to a court,” said Jim Wyda, the federal public defender in Maryland, in an email.

“This is going to result in a lot of litigation, for a long time.”

"Parallel construction" is really intelligence laundering
http://www.democraticunderground.com/10023425612

The government calls the practice "parallel construction," but deciphering their double speak, the practice should really be known as "intelligence laundering." This deception and dishonesty raises a host of serious legal problems.

~snip~

Taken together, the Fifth and Sixth Amendments guarantee a criminal defendant a meaningful opportunity to present a defense and challenge the government's case. But this intelligence laundering deprives defendants of these important constitutional protections. It makes it harder for prosecutors to comply with their ethical obligation under Brady v. Maryland to disclose any exculpatory or favorable evidence to the defense—an obligation that extends to disclosing evidence bearing on the reliability of a government witness. Hiding the source of information used by the government to initiate an investigation or make an arrest means defendants are deprived of the opportunity to challenge the accuracy or veracity of the government's investigation, let alone seek out favorable evidence in the government's possession.

The third major legal problem is that the practice suggests DEA agents are misleading the courts. Wiretaps, search warrants, and other forms of surveillance authorizations require law enforcement to go to a judge and lay out the facts that support the request. The court's function is to scrutinize the facts to determine the appropriate legal standard has been met based on truthful, reliable evidence. So, for example, if the government is using evidence gathered from an informant to support its request for a search warrant, it has to establish to the court that the informant is reliable and trustworthy so that the court can be convinced there is probable cause to support the search. But when law enforcement omits integral facts—like the source of a tip used to make an arrest—the court is deprived of the opportunity to fulfill its traditional role and searches are signed off without the full knowledge of the court.

https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2013/08/dea-and-nsa-team-intelligence-laundering

The NSA-DEA police state tango
http://www.salon.com/2013/08/10/the_nsa_dea_police_state_tango/singleton/

On the other hand, this is a genuinely sinister turn of events with a whiff of science-fiction nightmare, one that has sounded loud alarm bells for many people in the mainstream legal world. Nancy Gertner, a Harvard Law professor who spent 18 years as a federal judge and cannot be accused of being a radical, told Reuters she finds the DEA story more troubling than anything in Edward Snowden’s NSA leaks. It’s the first clear evidence that the “special rules” and disregard for constitutional law that have characterized the hunt for so-called terrorists have crept into the domestic criminal justice system on a significant scale. “It sounds like they are phonying up investigations,” she said. Maybe this is how a police state comes to America: Not with a bang, but with a parallel construction.

NSA shares raw intelligence including Americans' data with Israel
http://www.democraticunderground.com/1014592092
Source: Guardian
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/sep/11/nsa-americans-personal-data-israel-documents

The National Security Agency routinely shares raw intelligence data with Israel without first sifting it to remove information about US citizens, a top-secret document provided to the Guardian by whistleblower Edward Snowden reveals.

Details of the intelligence-sharing agreement are laid out in a memorandum of understanding between the NSA and its Israeli counterpart that shows the US government handed over intercepted communications likely to contain phone calls and emails of American citizens. The agreement places no legally binding limits on the use of the data by the Israelis.

The disclosure that the NSA agreed to provide raw intelligence data to a foreign country contrasts with assurances from the Obama administration that there are rigorous safeguards to protect the privacy of US citizens caught in the dragnet. The intelligence community calls this process "minimization", but the memorandum makes clear that the information shared with the Israelis would be in its pre-minimized state.

The deal was reached in principle in March 2009, according to the undated memorandum, which lays out the ground rules for the intelligence sharing.

BUSTING the 'Man-in-the-Middle' of Ohio Vote Rigging 2004
http://www.democraticunderground.com/101735420

At 42:32, Stephen Spoonamore expresses concern that Israel may interfere with American elections by hacking.

#t=2563

June 5, 2007
The Honorable David Walker
Comptroller General of the United States
Government Accountability Office
441 G Street, NW
Washington, D.C. 20548

Dear Mr. Walker:

In August 2005, the Government Accountability Office issued a report on data mining
(GAO-05-866) that looked into the specific data mining initiatives of five federal agencies. The
report concluded that none of the five programs examined, including the Federal Bureau Of
Investigation's (FBI) Foreign Terrorist Tracking Task Force (FTTTF), complied with all relevant
federal laws and executive branch guidance. This included administrative, technical and
physical safeguards as mandated by the Privacy Act of 1974, guidance from the Office of
Management and Budget and federal information security standards set forth by the National
Institute of Standards and Technology as detailed in the Federal Information Security
Management Act of2002. Further, the Computer Security Act of 1987, details requirements to
establish security plans for Federal computer systems that contain sensitive information.

The Foreign Terrorist Tracking Task Force was established by the President in the
immediate aftermath of the September 11,2001, terrorist attacks as an interagency group under
the auspices ofthe Department ofJustice. Its original mission was to deny entry into the United
States by aliens suspected ofhaving ties to terrorist organizations and to locate, detain,
prosecute, or deport such aliens already present in the United States.

But documents now indicate that the FTTTF is expanding its mission to encompass the
"detection, identification, and tracking of individuals or entities that pose threats to the United
States and its interests through the use of advanced analytical techniques, technologies, and data
resources." This mission will be accomplished through the use of bulk data analysis, pattern
analysis, trend analysis and other programs, according to Justice Department budget documents
reviewed by the Subcommittee. "The FBI's efforts to define predictive models and patterns of
behavior will improve efforts to identify "sleeper cells," the documents suggest. The centerpiece
ofthis greatly enhanced effort will be a newly proposed National Security Branch Analysis
Center (NSAC).

The FBI is seeking $12 million for the center in FY2008, which will include 90,000
square feet of office space and a total of 59 staff, including 23 contractors and five FBI agents.
Documents predict the NSAC will include six billion records by FY2012. This amounts to 20
separate "records" for each man, woman and child in the United States. The ''universe of
subjects will expand exponentially" with the expanded role ofthe NSAC, the Justice Department
documents assert.

The expanded and sweeping scope ofthe NSAC bears a striking resemblance to the
Defense Advanced Research Project Agency's Total Information Awareness program which
Congress terminated funding for in 2003 because of privacy and other concerns. Sharing critical
information that can help law enforcement officer' s track down known terrorists is
extraordinarily important and needs to be improved. But the NSAC proposes to do much more
than simply track down known terrorist suspects. Eleven of its proposed 59 staff will constitute
a Proactive Data Exploitation unit - tasked with ferreting out "patterns" of suspicious behavior in
the data the center collects. "The NSAC will leverage existing data mining tools to help identify
relationships between individuals, locations, and events that may be indicators of terrorist or
other activities ofinterest," according to the Justice Department budget documents

Data mining experts outside of government see great potential for abuse in this sort of
proposal. Jeff Jonas, a world renowned data mining expert and IBM Distinguished Engineer,
recently co-authored a critical review of "predictive" counterterrorism data mining efforts for the
Cato Institute. "It would be unfortunate if data mining for terrorism discovery had currency
within national security, law enforcement, and technology circles," wrote Jonas, "because
pursuing this use of data mining would waste taxpayer dollars, needlessly infringe on privacy
and civil liberties, and misdirect the valuable time and energy ofthe men and women in the
national security community." Jonas supports other non-predictive or "pattern analysis" data
mining efforts that permit law enforcement agencies to "efficiently locate, access, and aggregate
information about specific suspects," he writes. But he does not believe data mining is suited to
discovering unknown terrorists as a result of culling through massive mounds of data that contain
"patterns" of individual behavior. Jonas argues that with an extraordinarily limited pool of
known terrorist patterns of behavior a hunt for terrorists in this way would inevitably "flood the
national security system with false positives - suspects who are truly innocent." In addition,
argues Jonas, collocating massive amounts of data in a central repository poses significant
logistical and security challenges and may invite misuse of the information.

Given the scope ofthe NSAC endeavor, Congress has a duty to understand fully what
information will be contained in the "records" it collects, whether the "records" of U.S. citizens
will be included in its database, how this data will be employed and how the FBI plans to ensure
that the data is not misused or abused in any way. A critical question is how the FBI will ensure
that the records it obtains from other agencies is accurate, valid and complies with federal legal
guidelines and policies. The FTTTF, for instance, shares "innovative technology" with the
Defense Department's Counterintelligence Field Activity (CIFA) and the proposed NSAC will
presumably maintain or expand on this relationship. This is of particular concern given the fact
that the Defense Department has acknowledged that CIFA was compiling data in one ofits
databases on non-violent war protestors and civil rights activists in violation of DOD's own
policies. The Bureau needs to beware that it does not repeat the mistakes of other agencies.
Even with those assurances the agency may have difficulty developing and operating the NSAC.

The FBI has historically been unable to develop information systems in a reliable, cost
effective and technically proficient manner. In 2005, after investing $170 million, the agency
cancelled its Virtual Case File computerized records management system because oftechnical
troubles. Sentinel, the replacement for this system, is now reportedly running behind schedule.
Most troubling, last year it was revealed that a FBI-computer consultant managed to hack into
the FBI's classified computer system, gaining access to records on counterespionage and the
Witness Protection Program, as well as the passwords of 38,000 employees, including FBI
Director Robert S. Mueller III.

In March 2007, the Department of Justice Office of the Inspector General issued a report
on the FBI's use of National Security Letters. That report found that the Bureau had demanded
personal data without proper authorization, improperly obtained personal telephone and banking
records and underreported to Congress how often it used national security letters to obtain
information on thousands of U.S. citizens and legal residents. Inspector General Glen Fine said
that he found 48 separate violations oflaw in the use of national security letters that resulted in
as many as 3,000 violations among more than 143,000 requests for information between 2003
and 2005.

These examples lead the Subcommittee to question whether the NSAC design,
development and implementation is incorporating the lessons learned by the Bureau from
previous systems. Are the safeguards required for such systems in place within the NSAC's
database? We request a review ofthe NSAC to address the following questions:

1. What is the specific role and purpose ofthe NSAC and what requirements in the
center's mission explain the size and scope of this planned database?

2. What types of "records" will be incorporated into the database, from which agencies
or commercial enterprises will they be obtained and will any other entities be granted
access to the database and under what restrictions?

3. Will the NSAC include any records on U.S. citizens and what provisions are in place
to guarantee that any records collected or accessed are consistent with existing law,
regulation, policy or other agency guidance?

4. How does the center intend to exploit the data it collects by utilizing specific
analytical tools - including "pattern recognition," "predictive data mining," "social
network analysis," and related software programs?

Please have your staff contact Douglas Pasternak, Subcommittee professional staffmember
at [phone], Bart Forsyth, Counsel to Rep. Sensenbrenner at [phone] or Dan
Pearson, Subcommittee staff director at [phone] to discuss this request further.
Your assistance in this matter is greatly appreciated.
Sincerely,

BRAD MILLER
Chairman
Subcommittee on
Investigations & Oversight

JAMES SENSENBRENNER, JR.
Ranking Member