ERRORS in rebuttal to "Pandora's Promise"

[PamW]

66. Yes - I know Harold...

Last edited Fri Dec 6, 2013, 11:23 AM - Edit history (1)

kristopher,

Yes - I know Harold McFarlane from the years I was at Argonne.

The full text of Harold McFarlane's paper can be found at:

http://www.ipd.anl.gov/anlpubs/2002/07/43534.pdf

Look at the sentence immediately preceding the one you emphasize:

Performing a proliferation-resistance assessment for deployment of an IFR nuclear park in a country that otherwise does not possess a significant nuclear infrastructure is not a particularly useful exercise— in spite of the fact that its intrinsic barriers would be relatively effective in such a situation.

The IFR presents VERY SIGNIFICANT intrinsic barriers to proliferation that MacFarlane says would be RELATIVELY EFFECTIVE at preventing proliferation.

However, what MacFarlane points out is that it always seems that when the nuclear non-proliferation community considers the proliferation resistance of a particular technology; they always seem to hypothesize that we are going to give this technology to Iran, North Korea, Syria... the latest potential proliferant; and then the non-proliferation community works like crazy to find ways to circumvent the non-proliferation barriers.

WHO SAYS WE HAVE TO GIVE THIS TECHNOLOGY TO THE PROLIFERANTS???

Why can't the USA alone use IFR technology; and then we don't have to worry about the technology being misused by the rest of the world.

The USA is a country that fits the description of the sentence you emphasized. The USA has a substantial nuclear development; and how nuclear waste is disposed of, and the security of our energy facilities ARE priorities for the USA.

I would STRONGLY disagree with the other statement that you highlight about extrinsic vs intrinsic barriers. Yes - the extrinsic barriers seem to make "policy wonks" get the "warm fuzzies"; and they don't like "intrinsic barriers" because they are very technical. However, I would point out that we had an extensive regime of "extrinsic barriers" with Iraq in the 1980s. Hans Blix and his inspectors were regularly inspecting Iraq and giving them "A+" ratings for compliance with the NPT.

However, that all came crashing down after the inspectors got into Iraq after the 1991 Iraq War. It turned out that Iraq was certainly "knocking on the door" of having nuclear weapons. They were even enriching uranium via the EMIS - ElectroMagnetic Isotope Separation process totally unbeknownst to Hans Blix and his cadre of IAEA inspectors. So I don't put much faith in "extrinsic" barriers; although the "policy wonks" like them.

From the Federation of American Scientists; an assessment of the Iraq nuclear weapons program pre-1991:

http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/iraq/nuke/program.htm

Before the 1991 Gulf War, Iraqi scientists had progressed through several design iterations for a fission weapon based on an implosion design (one that is much more difficult to develop than the alternative, gun-type design. Still at the early stages of completing a design, they had successfully overcome some of, but certainly not all of the obstacles to a workable device. Using highly enriched uranium (HEU), a completed device based on the latest Iraqi design reportedly might have weighed from about a ton to somewhat more than a ton.

A one-ton nuclear weapon would certainly be within the capacity for their Al-Hussein ( aka SCUD ) missile. Also:

How close Iraq was to completing a bomb is still open to debate....These designers reportedly concluded that bottlenecks in the program could have delayed completion of a working bomb for at least three years, assuming Iraq had continued its multifaceted strategy and design approach...However, several experts familiar with the inspections believe that Iraq could also probably have produced a workable device in as little as 6 to 24 months, had they decided to seize foreign-supplied HEU from under safeguards and focus their efforts on a crash program to produce a device in the shortest possible amount of time.

So; depending on which experts you believe; Iraq was somewhere between 6-24 months and 3 years away from having a nuclear weapon. I don't think that's very good; when all the while Hans Blix and the IAEA was saying all during the '80s that Iraq was in compliance with the NPT.

Contrary to your statement about the proliferation studies from 1986 to 2003; those studies were all on GENERIC reprocessing and pyroprocessing technologies. The ONLY study that used the SPECIFIC Argonne design; and not generalizations; was the Lawrence Livermore study that I have been referencing. Besides; Oak Ridge is NOT a nuclear weapons design laboratory. When it comes to nuclear weapons design; the USA has ONLY TWO nuclear weapons design labs; and those are Los Alamos and Lawrence Livermore. They are the ONLY true nuclear weapons experts in the USA; and since the proliferation resistance involves nuclear weapons design; I give LANL and LLNL INFINITELY more credence than I would ORNL.

To address your first concerns, what is "Integrated" with the IFR is the fuel reprocessing system. The reactor and the reprocessing system are a "matched set".

There are a number of feed stocks that could go into the IFR; the normal uranium feedstock supply for our current Light Water Reactors could be used; as could material taken out of weapons... As to what comes out; what comes out is "fission products". In Argonne's IFR conception; ALL Plutonium stays within the IFR system, within the high-radiation area where personnel can't go. The Plutonium is recycled in that environment until it is fissioned; and ONLY THEN will the fission products be removed.

In addition to the interview with Dr. Till that I've repeated cited; there's another good summary by Argonne scientist George P. Stanford:

http://www.thesciencecouncil.com/index.php/george-stanford

http://www.nationalcenter.org/NPA378.html

( Yes - I do know that the National Center is a conservative group. However, the AUTHOR of the piece is a scientist. The paper could just as well have been published by a more progressive publication - except they don't seem to give the time of day to nuclear scientists. I would hope that would change.)

Some of what Dr. Stanford says:

If IFRs can be either breeders or burners, why do some people insist on calling them breeders?

Partly for historical reasons (originally, fast reactors were investigated because of their potential to breed), partly because of genuine confusion, and partly for the emotional impact, since "breeder" carries the subliminal connotation of runaway plutonium production. The central fact that those people are missing is that with IFRs you can choose not to breed plutonium, whereas with thermal reactors you make plutonium whether you want it or not.

Then it is today's reactors that are runaway producers of plutonium, and IFRs could put a stop to it.

Exactly.

and

How can that be?

An IFR plant will be a "sink" for plutonium: plutonium to be disposed of is shipped in, and there it is consumed, with on-site recycling as needed. Only trace amounts ever come out.

Here's the answer to why the non-proliferation community and the studies from 1986 to 2001 got different answers that what Argonne / LLNL came up with finally. That's because previous studies were done ASSUMING the reprocessing was done by PUREX:

How does the IFR square with U.S. policy of discouraging plutonium production, reprocessing and use?

It is entirely consistent with the intent of that policy - to render plutonium as inaccessible for weapons use as possible. The wording of the policy, however, is now obsolete.

How so?

It was formulated before the IFR's pyroprocessing and electrorefining technology was known - when "reprocessing" was synonymous with PUREX, which creates plutonium of the chemical purity needed for weapons. Since now there is a fuel cycle that promises to provide far-superior management of plutonium, the policy has been overtaken by events.

Why is the IFR better than PUREX? Doesn't "recycling" mean separation of plutonium, regardless of the method?

No, not in the IFR - and that misunderstanding accounts for some of the opposition. The IFR's pyroprocessing and electrorefining method is not capable of making plutonium that is pure enough for weapons. If a proliferator were to start with IFR material, he or she would have to employ an extra chemical separation step.

But there is plutonium in IFRs, along with other fissionable isotopes. Seems to me that a proliferator could take some of that and make a bomb.

Some people do say that, but they're wrong, according to expert bomb designers at Livermore National Laboratory. They looked at the problem in detail, and concluded that plutonium-bearing material taken from anywhere in the IFR cycle was so ornery, because of inherent heat, radioactivity and spontaneous neutrons, that making a bomb with it without chemical separation of the plutonium would be essentially impossible - far, far harder than using today's reactor-grade plutonium.


The ONLY study that was done that used the Argonne approved specific design for both reactor and reprocessing facility was the Lawrence Livermore study. Additionally, the ONLY proliferation study that was done by a nuclear weapons design laboratory who are the ONLY real experts as to what can / can not be used to make a nuclear weapon; was again, the study by Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory.

So; yes - there have been LOTS of studies by people from Universities and national labs, and "think tanks"....you name it.

However, the ONLY study that got the true design specifications directly from Argonne was the LLNL study.

Additionally, the others have to GUESS as to what could / could not be used in a bomb. NONE of the people at those Universities, "think tanks" or whatever... have ANY REAL nuclear weapon design experience; by which I mean; they designed something that was put into a hole in Nevada and made a nuclear explosion when they pulled the trigger.

So the ONLY study that really PASSES MUSTER with good scientific principles; is the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory study; and we all KNOW what that one says!!!

PamW