Latest Bonneville proposal:
http://www.bpa.gov/corporate/AgencyTopics/ColumbiaRiverHighWaterMgmnt/20120306-filing/EL11-44_BPA_Compliance_Filing_03-06-2012.pdf
It's a 50-50 cost split.
This is the page with all the links:
http://www.bpa.gov/corporate/AgencyTopics/ColumbiaRiverHighWaterMgmnt/?utm_source=Go%2BAddress&utm_medium=Print&utm_campaign=Oversupply
This spring Bonneville will convene a rate case to establish a rate for the recovery of costs incurred under the Oversupply Management Protocol. In its initial proposal in the rate case, Bonneville will propose to allocate approximately 50% of the costs to generators that submit displacement costs under the protocol and approximately 50% to purchasers of power from the Federal Base System (a defined term under the Northwest Power Act; it includes the Federal Columbia River Power System hydroelectric projects, resources acquired by the Administrator under long-term contracts in force on the effective date of the Act (December 5, 1980), and resources acquired by the Administrator to replace reductions in the above resources).
Reasonable arguments have been made that both federal hydroelectric resources and wind resources contribute to the oversupply problem and the costs associated with negative pricing. In one sense the costs are caused by fish and wildlife obligations that predated the interconnection of wind resources to Bonneville’s system. On the other hand, Bonneville was able to adequately manage high-water occurrences before the development of large amounts of variable energy resources, primarily wind power, that receive incentives for production and therefore need to be compensated beyond low-priced or free substitute electricity. There is also a view that costs should be allocated based on what generating resources are on-line at the time of the oversupply (which would be primarily hydro) while another view holds that the federal hydrosystem will have engaged in substantial spill prior to engaging in wind displacement due to reaching Clean Water Act limits for gas supersaturation
Bonneville is also seeking to find a solution that has the greatest chance of being found to be equitable by the affected parties and hence a reduced chance of litigation. Therefore, the 50/50 cost allocation is arguably a reasonable and fair allocation of costs and alignment of costs and benefits because it recognizes all of these arguments, and it is not unreasonable for Bonneville to advance it as a proposal at the opening of Bonneville’s ratemaking process. In addition, it creates an incentive for beneficiaries of both hydro and wind power to seek longer-term, potentially lower-cost solutions that would provide a better use of a surplus of low variable cost, carbon-free electricity that occurs in the Pacific Northwest.
The proposal is that the cost will be split equally between purchasers and displaced generators.
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