First OP since the election..."Fool me once, shame on you...

[elleng]

2. THANK YOU! 'I supported Obama early in 2008 because I witnessed, and understood first-hand,

the visceral hatred of Hillary Clinton amongst the white working class of Michigan. I never felt comfortable in her ability to win this region in a general election, which is a big reason I again supported her rival this year.

Therein lies the frustration and anger...if I could see it, then how in the hell could the Democratic Party not have? And if they did realize Hillary's weakness in the rust belt, then why on God's green earth did they work so hard to sabotage a candidate that was compelling here? To secure their own influence and futures is the answer I'm left with.

And how does Hillary not campaign in WI once in the general election after being so soundly beaten there in the primaries? The arrogance of that decision in particular is astounding.

We can complain about Putin and Comey, and sure, their influence in this election is bullshit, and I am utterly baffled that Washington is not (metaphorically) burning over it.

But, if we cannot reconcile the fatal mistakes that the Clinton campaign and the Democratic Party brazenly committed not once, but twice, and with intent, then this party will never achieve a majority again.

Enthusiasm matters, the Midwest matters, populism matters, distance from Wall Street matters. Recognize this now, finally, or fade into obscurity.'

The Hubris Of The Clinton Ground Game 'helped' mightily.

This piece was first published in Jacobin under the headline ‘Garbage In, Garbage Out.’

'It is now becoming clear that Clinton’s ground game — the watchword for defenders of her alleged competence — was actually under-resourced and poorly executed. Like so much else in this election, her field strategy was hostage to the colossal arrogance and consequent incompetence of the liberal establishment.

At the heart of the failure was the notion of the “new emerging majority.” According to this argument — pushed by, among others, John Judis and Ruy Teixeira — women, Latinos, blacks, and skilled professionals who support the Democrats were becoming the demographic majority. Thus the traditional white working-class base of the Democratic Party could be sidelined.

Back in July Chuck Schumer summed it up: “For every blue-collar Democrat we lose in western Pennsylvania, we will pick up two moderate Republicans in the suburbs in Philadelphia, and you can repeat that in Ohio and Illinois and Wisconsin.”

From this theory and strategy flowed a deeply flawed set of tactics, and a badly fumbled get-out-the-vote (GOTV) effort.

A labor organizer in Ohio, who wished to remain anonymous, reports that Clinton’s early GOTV effort there focused on Republicans in the mistaken belief a significant number of them could be peeled away. This play largely failed. And it also involved serious opportunity costs: traditional Democratic constituencies like African Americans and the white working class were neglected, and Clinton ended up badly under-performing Obama among both groups, especially in the Rust Belt.

Only in the last two weeks, according to this labor source, did the Democratic Party outreach effort really switch back to traditional Democratic voters. By then, it was too late. Due to lack of preparation, the voter lists guiding the effort had not been updated. Because poorer voters tend to relocate more frequently than home-owning suburbanites, many addresses were wrong. And for lack of more frequent contact the campaign was often unsure about the voters’ current political attitudes.

And when the campaign finally showed up in the African-American, Latino, and white working-class areas they got lots of “so you only come by once every four years?”'>>>

http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/the-hubris-of-the-clinton-ground-game_us_5831cebce4b099512f835e78