This lawsuit is a piece of crap filed by some attorneys who want to sell a book. The trial court dismissed this case due to lack of standing for the plaintiffs and other valid reasons
http://jampac.us/wp-content/uploads/2017/08/62-D.E.-62-Ord-of-Dismissal-8-25-17.pdf
This Order therefore concerns only technical matters of pleading and subject-matter jurisdiction. To the extent Plaintiffs wish to air their general grievances with the DNC or its candidate selection process, their redress is through the ballot box, the DNC’s internal workings, or their right of free speech——not through the judiciary. To the extent Plaintiffs have asserted specific causes of action grounded in specific factual allegations, it is this Court’s emphatic duty to measure Plaintiffs’ pleadings against existing legal standards. Having done so, and for the reasons that follow, the Court finds that the named Plaintiffs have not presented a case that is cognizable in federal court.
The Court concluded
“Federal Courts cannot exercise jurisdiction over cases where the parties lack standing.” Florida Wildlife Fed’n, Inc. v. S. Fla. Water Mgmt. Dist., 647 F.3d 1296, 1302 (11th Cir. 2012). Because Plaintiffs do not allege a causal link between their donations and the DNC’s statements, they lack standing to assert the fraud-type claims in Counts I, II, III, and IV of the First Amended Complaint (DE 8). Their breach of fiduciary duty claim in Count V relies on a harm far too diffuse to constitute an injury in-fact in federal court. And their negligence claim in Count VI is buffered by too many layers of speculation and conjecture to create the immediacy of harm necessary to unlock this Court’s jurisdiction. That being so, Plaintiffs have not “present[ed] a live case or controversy,” and the Court “must dismiss the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.” Id.
In the original petition, the idiot lawyers who filed this lawsuit did not understand the federal rules of civil procedure and how to plead for diversity jurisdiction for a class action case. The court allowed these idiots to fix this defect. The fact that the idiots who filed this case were not aware that there are special pleading rules for class actions in federal court says a great deal about their competence.
I had fun reading the briefs and it is clear that the plaintiff attorneys are idiots. The plaintiff's brief was weak but amusing
http://jampac.us/wp-content/uploads/2018/01/1-19-18-Initial-Brief-1.pdf
I love this footnote in the DNC's brief
http://jampac.us/wp-content/uploads/2018/02/2-20-18-Ds-Response-Brief.pdf
Demonstrative of Plaintiffs’ desire to use this litigation for political purposes, Plaintiffs have used social media to present their version of this litigation, to peddle conspiracy theories and to disparage Defendants. See DE 26 pp. 8-10, 27-3, 27-9. For example, Plaintiffs’ counsel Jared Beck repeatedly refers to the DNC as “shi*bags” on Twitter and uses other degrading language in reference to Defendants. DE 27-3. He has also repeatedly promoted patently false and deeply offensive conspiracy theories about the deaths of a former DNC staffer and Plaintiffs’ process server in an attempt to bolster attention for this lawsuit. DE 27-8 & 27-9; see also Appellants’ Br. at 4.
One of the dumbest claims in the plaintiff's original complaint was that the sanders donors were consumers under the DC consumer protection act. When I read this in the first petition, I laughed. The DNC had fun pointing out how stupid this claim is.
D. Plaintiffs Are Not “Consumers” and Cannot State a Claim Under the D.C. Consumer Protection Procedures Act (Count III).
Plaintiffs cannot satisfy the requirements for bringing a claim under the D.C. Consumer Protection Procedures Act (“CPPA”), because neither political donors nor members of a political party are “consumers” within the meaning of the statute. See D.C. Code § 28-3901(a)(2) (defining a consumer as “a person who, other than for purposes of resale, does or would purchase, lease (as lessee), or receive consumer goods or services, including as a co-obliger or surety, or does or would otherwise provide the economic demand for a trade practice”). Plaintiffs did not purchase any goods or services from either Defendant. See Slaby v. Fairbridge, 3 F. Supp. 2d 22, 27 (D.D.C. 1998) (“Plaintiff . . . does not allege that she purchased, leased or received consumer goods or services from defendant . . . and therefore fails to establish any consumer-merchant relationship to bring it within the scope of the [statute].”); see also Howard v. Riggs Nat’l Bank, 432 A.2d 701, 709 (D.C. 1981) (limiting the application of the CPPA pursuant to D.C. Code § 28-3901(a)(3) to “the merchant, or another merchant further along the supply chain”).
I am glad that the briefing is done in this appeal. I am still not impressed with the work of the plaintiff attorneys.
The best that the plaintiffs can hope for is a chance to re-plead this case. I am hopeful that the court should do the right thing and dismiss this piece of dreck.
