and that's the problem.
Electronic voting systems were designed by the same folks who were providing mechanical systems. They designed them not as secure electronic devices, but as tools that depended on the same physical mechanisms as election protection has always depended on: locked doors, no access to the election materials without the presence of both parties (including during transport with members from each party being in the transport vehicle), voting in plain sight of both pollworkers who belong to each party, but your friends and neighbors, etc.
Being an observer would help you understand the physical security, the care taken by members of both parties to protect the integity of the election, the impossibility of actually carrying out all of the hacks people are suggesting are happening (none could have been carried out in any of the many precincts where I've been an observer, or in the county board of elections where I've also been an observer - for the entire process of the election from start to finish. (I have performed this service in both heavily democratic and heavily republican counties).
As I've explained repeatedly, what goes on inside the black box irrelevant when you have the actual physical ballots which are designated by law as the formal indicator of the voter's intent. Scanner technology is very straightforward - and has been used since at least the 70s on high stakes testing. I've spent a considerable amount of time testing at least two versions of the scanners currently in eletion service, and I've read the code for one of them. In the event there is a suspicion something is going on that shouldn't be, it is pretty trivial to test and confirm or dispel the suspicions because you have the physical ballots that produced the count.
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