Part of it:
is in precedent. Casey relied on cases involving the right to marry a person ofa different race, Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1(1967); the right to marry while in prison, Turnerv. Saftey, 482 U. S. 78 (1987); the right to obtain contracep- tives, Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), Eisen- stadt v. Baird, 405 U. S. 438 (1972), Carey v. Population Services International, 431 U. S. 678 (1977); the righttore- side with relatives, Moore v. Fast Cleveland, 431 U. S. 494 1977); the right to make decisions about the education of one's children, Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U. S. 510 (1925), Meyerv. Nebraska, 262 U. S. 390 (1925); the right not to be sterilized without consent, Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U. S. 535 (1942); and the right in certain circumstances not to undergo involuntary surgery, forced administration of drugs, or other substantially simi. lar procedures, Winston v. Lee, 470 U. S. 753 (1985), Wash- ington. Harper, 494 U. S. 210 (1990), Rochin.v. California, 342 U. S. 165 (1952). Respondents and the Solicitor Gen eral also rely on post-Casey decisions like Lawrence v.
Texas, 539 U. S. 558 (2008) (right to engage in private, con- sensual sexual acts), and Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U. S. 644 (2015) (right to marry a person of the same sex). See Brieffor Respondents 18; Brieffor United Statesas Amicus Curiae 23-24.
These attempts tojustify abortion through appeals to a broader right to autonomy and to define one's concept of existence prove too much. Casey, 505 U. S., at 851. Those criteria, at a high level of generality, could license funda. mental rights to illicit drug use, prostitution, and the like. See Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 85 F.3d 1140, 1444 (CA9 1996) (O'Scannlain, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc). None ofthese rights has any claim to being deeply rooted in history. Id., at 1440, 1445.