The Most Decorated Woman Soldier of WWII has died

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23. It takes time to get a unit to work together as a unit.

Individual training is relatively easy. Think it terms of whoever is the Super bowl champions against the NFL's top players. The Super bowl champs had played together as a team for at least six months, do to that training they can count on people doing certain things (and thus know where they should be). The players selected for the Pro-Bowl, have worked together less then a week. Even if each player on the Pro=Bowl Player is better then the opposite player on the Super Bowl champion team, the fact that the Super Bowl Champion team has played AS A TEAM for six months give them a huge advantage. They know where the other players of their team will be and can and can not do AND how to play with those team members. The Pro Bowl players do not for they have NOT played that much together (in fact the NFL knows this for the rules are DIFFERENT for the pro-bowl then any other NFL game, for the simple reason it takes a long while to get people to work as a team).

Thus the lack of training from 1934-1938 do to a lack of supplies do to the internal political fight in France, by 1938 you had an army that on the surface as very strong, but had fundamental problems. 1938-1940 was NOR enough time to fix those problems. One area was the number of horses available to haul supplies. Now, it may shock people but by 1940 only the much smaller British army had completely mechanized (and that had to do with the loss of horse raising areas in Ireland when Ireland became independent). Both the French AND German armies still depended on the horse to haul supplies in 1940 (In fact horse hauling for the German Army would INCREASE as the war went on do to the loss of access to Russia Oil after June 1941).

Thus the lack of enough horses reduced the manageability of the French Army (While the German Army had enough horses, for Germany could pull from Hungary, a WWII German Ally and then Poland after October 1939).

The French had reduced their acquisition of horses in the mid 1930s and could not obtain enough after their declared war in 1939 (and was one of the reason the French did not plan any offensive operations till 1941). Airplane production had been similarly delayed and France was just starting to put modern planes into production when the German hit (The same for Britain, but the Battle of France permitted Britain to produce modern planes for six weeks before the Battle of Britain, without that six weeks of production Britain would have clearly loss the Battle of Britain, you have to remember the Germans came within days of driving the British planes out of Southern Britain, had the British been forced to pull what planes they had out of Southern Britain, German could have invaded for Germany would have had complete air superiority over the coastline of southern England).

I bring up the battle of Britain to show that the United Kingdom was not much then France was in May 1940, but France had to defend on land in addition to the air, while Britain during the battle of Britain only had to fight in the air (Germany had no fleet). If Britain had been forced to with draw its air forces to Northern England to preserve them for later use, Germany would have had air Superior ty and the British Fleet could have been forced to attack the German Invasion force at the time the German would pick. The German would pick a time where their Air Superior ty and submarines would do the most damage to the British fleet.

Back to France. Yes, Supply movement, equipment and training are part of Strategy but the French did consider them in 1940, thus the decision to stay on the defensive till 1941. Back to the Pro-Bowl for a second. The Pro Bowl rules are very restrictive as to the Defense compared to the Offensive, for Defense is generally easier to do.

Now in the winter of 1939-1940 the French came out with their operation D, A Plan that assumed a German Attack on the Dutch-Belgium Border (Open country, Ideal for tanks). When that attack occurred, the Dutch and the Belgium's had agreed to drop their neutrality and agree to the French Army to enter and support them. The problem was the French Army was depending on both countries to have prepared defensive positions for the French Army, defensive position neither country built.

In many ways the French decision to defend the low countries was France's biggest mistake. Had the French Army stayed in France when the German attacked the Netherlands and Belgium, they could waited for the German armor to go by and attack north cutting the German Attack in half (and this was the greatest fear of the German High Command for it meant the quick defeat of German Armor Formations that would take years to replace, years German would NOT have after such a defeat).

The French army had some other problems beside a shortage of horses. It had a shortage of Radios. Germany had embraced the radio big time in the 1930s as had Britain, but again do to the Political infighting in the mid 1930s, Radios had been a low priority for the French Army (One commentator said the French Army of mid 1930s saw no need for Radios, for the French Army saw its main duty in the mid 1930s as putting down a Communist Revolution in France NOT fighting Germany i.e. putting down another French Commune NOT driving the Germans from France).

In 1940 this decision made the French Army less able to adjust to Battle Field changes, but it would have been a minor problem if the French Army stayed on the Defensive. The real disaster was that the French Army had committed itself to Defend the Low Countries, while also staying out of those countries until they were attacked. i.e. The French Army, unprepared to do offensive operations, were committed to offensive operations.

Thus, the overall Strategy of the French was sound, be on the defensive and respond to what the Germans did. The problem was France had to commit itself to losing Belgium, something France did not want to do. France wanted to move from one Defensive position to another, which was itself correct, but permitted itself only to do so when Germany had already launched an attack. In 1940 France was NOT capable of that, it lacked the Horses, the Trucks and the radios to fight a war of maneuver. France could launch an attack against the supply lines of a German Attack, but not go head on with those same units.

Thus the Grand Strategy of being on the Defensive was correct for the French in 1940, the Grand Strategic decision to also defend Belgium was the fatal flaw. France should have told the Belgium's either permit our troops in between November and March 1940, or we will NOT send any French Troops to defend Belgium. Had the French adopted that policy, when the German Attack, they would have quickly seen that the French Army was staying in France. The German Army would have hit the English Channel Coast about the same time as it did, but would have no French or British troops within its net, those troops would have all still be in France, capable of cutting the German Forces in half and then go back on the defensive.

Just pointing out the Strategy was sound, given what the French Army was capable of in 1940. The problem was the decision to defend Belgium, when Belgium demanded that the French Army only advance into Belgium when the Germans had attacked not before.

More on the Battle of France:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_France