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brentspeak

(18,290 posts)
4. Congrats on winning Dumb Post of the Week
Wed Apr 18, 2012, 05:26 PM
Apr 2012


http://4closurefraud.org/2010/07/07/the-role-of-derivatives-in-the-financial-crisis-credit-default-swaps-and-the-economic-meltdown/

The Role of Derivatives in the Financial Crisis – Credit Default Swaps and the Economic Meltdown

Testimony
of
Michael Greenberger
Law School Professor
University of Maryland School of Law

~
Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission Hearing
Dirksen Senate Office Building, Room 538
Washington DC
Wednesday, June 30, 2010, 9am EDT

By removing the multi-trillion dollar swaps market from the traditional norms of market regulation, a highly speculative derivative bubble was created that was opaque to federal regulators and market observers alike. By removing all forms of ensuring the normal capital adequacy protections of market regulation, the swaps market permitted trillions of dollars of financial commitments to be made with no assurance that those commitments could be fulfilled beyond the highly illusory AAA ratings of the counterparties in question.

Had the norms of market regulation been applicable, these swaps transactions would have been adequately capitalized by traditional clearing norms; and the dangers building up in these markets would otherwise have been observable by the transparency and price discipline that accompanies exchange trading.
While the poorly capitalized underwriting of CDS and naked CDS triggered the meltdown, the crisis was further aggravated by the opaque interconnectedness of large financial institutions emanating from interest rate, currency, foreign exchange and energy swaps.

Because there was no road map outlining interdependency of those financial transactions, the worst was feared in the wake of the Bear Stearns, Lehman, AIG, and Merrill dysfunctions. Institutions became too big to fail because of these uncharted and feared interdependencies; and the fear that unwinding of these institutions (as proven in the Lehman bankruptcy) would be hampered by the lack of reliable pricing of the instruments in question.

The darkness of this huge multi-trillion dollar unregulated market not only caused, but substantially aggravated, the financial crisis. And, the American taxpayer funded the bailouts and rescued the economy from Depression. The banks are now stronger than ever. The taxpayer, however, is burdened by high unemployment, job insecurity, depleted pensions, and little access to credit. We are depending on this Commission to identify correctly the malpractices to ensure that a fiasco of this nature never happens again.




http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/04/18/financial-regulation-swaps-idUSL2E8FG0BZ20120418

After heavy lobbying from energy companies and big commodity traders, the final version bumps the threshold up to $8 billion for most asset classes as an initial phase-in.

The CFTC also added a more explicit exemption for swaps that are done to hedge market risks, such as reducing exposure to interest-rate fluctuations or oil price moves. Those trades will not count toward the threshold that triggers the swap dealer designation.

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