Castro won.

[NewDeal_Dem]

136. As privatization began in 2001, apparently they were doing better before, yes.

Over the past ten years, Cuba’s economic decline has led to a slow but steady deterioration of water supplies and sanitation services — and a resulting increase in water-borne disease. When water shortages in parts of Cuba reached crisis proportions last year, two communities solved the problem by taking matters in their own hands — and using slow sand filters as home water-treatment systems.

http://www.idrc.ca/EN/Resources/Publications/Pages/ArticleDetails.aspx?PublicationID=904

And the Cuban Government is paying for the little rehabilitative work that IS being done.


Although the thrust
of Aguas de La Habana’s operation and maintenance strategy has been
to rehabilitate the old and leaky infrastructure of the city’s network, it is
an easy success for the private side of the company to boast. After all,
Aguas de La Habana is able to pursue investments in infrastructure repair
and replacement because it is the government, not AgBar, that pays for
this work under the concession agreement. In other words, this is not a
regulatory success on the part of INRH but the outcome of a contractual
arrangement that relieves the private partner of this responsibility. All
of which brings us back to earlier questions about the benefits of this
joint venture: if long-term fixed capital investments are underwritten by
INRH, why could similar improvements not have been accomplished
by INRH alone, without involving a private sector partner?

http://www.municipalservicesproject.org/sites/default/files/Water%20Privatization%20in%20Cuba%20-%20Antipode%20-%20Vol%2042,%20No%201%20-%202010.pdf