First they came for ConsortiumNews, and I did not speak out—

[Octafish]

518. April Glaspie affair exposes pro- anti-BFEE divisions within the Establishment.

Foreign Policy (Rockefeller, CFR, etc) on one hand promoted revisionist history that the liberals and non-warmonger set work to pile on Ms. Glaspie. Yet, FP also revealed that some of the scholars and statesmen and women are not willing to "play ball." That is good, for those who care about democracy.

WikiLeaks, April Glaspie, and Saddam Hussein

BY STEPHEN M. WALT
Foreign Policy, JANUARY 9, 2011

I’m generally not inclined to take issue with my FP colleagues, but David Kenner’s recent posting on the WikiLeaks release of a cable recounting Saddam Hussein’s infamous meeting with U.S. ambassador April Glaspie deserves a response.

In an article headlined "Why One U.S. Diplomat Didn’t Cause the Gulf War," Kenner argues that the new release shows that Glaspie should not be blamed for the U.S. failure to make a clear deterrent warning to Saddam. And that is what he accuses me and John Mearsheimer (and the Washington Post) of doing. In his words, "the Washington Post described her as ‘the face of American incompetence in Iraq.’ Stephen Walt and John Mearsheimer piled on in a 2003 article for Foreign Policy, arguing that Glaspie’s remarks unwittingly gave Iraq a green light to invade Kuwait."

I agree that the WikiLeaks release may exonerate Glaspie for being personally responsible for a diplomatic gaffe, but there are two problems with Kenner’s version of events.

First, we never accused Glaspie of diplomatic incompetence, and we certainly didn’t "pile on." Here’s what we actually said in our 2003 piece:

In a now famous interview with the Iraqi leader, U.S. Ambassador April Glaspie told Saddam, ‘[W]e have no opinion on the Arab-Arab conflicts, like your border disagreement with Kuwait.’ The U.S. State Department had earlier told Saddam that Washington had ‘no special defense or security commitments to Kuwait.’ The United States may not have intended to give Iraq a green light, but that is effectively what it did."

Notice that we offered no opinion on whether Glaspie was free-lancing, mis-reading Saddam, or simply following orders from Washington. Our article was focused on the issue of whether Saddam was deterrable, and the key issue that concerned us about the Glaspie meeting was whether she had conveyed a clear deterrent threat to Saddam, or whether she might have unintentionally given him reason to think he could go ahead and absorb Kuwait without facing a strong military response from the United States.

Second, a careful reading of the cable suggests that Saddam could have easily interpreted Glaspie’s conversation, along with other statements by U.S. officials, as a sign that the United States was not strongly committed to protecting Kuwait. For starters, the cable makes it clear that Saddam is at the end of his rope. He spends much of the conversation reciting a long list of grievances, and though his manner is described as "cordial, reasonable, and even warm," he repeatedly accuses the United States of having malign intentions toward Iraq. For example, the cable refers to one of his "main points" being that the "USG maneuvers with the UAE and Kuwait. . .[and] encouraged them in their ungenerous policies." And he makes it clear that his patience is not unlimited: "Iraqi rights, Saddam emphasized, will be restored one by one, thought it may take a month or much more than a year." He also speaks of the "pride" of Iraqis, whom he says believe in "liberty or death," and he warns that Iraq "will have to respond if the US uses these methods." He adds that "Iraq knows the USG can send planes and rockets and hurt Iraq deeply," but he "asks that the USG not force Iraq to the point of humiliation at which logic must be disregarded."

How does Glaspie respond to Saddam’s litany of grievances, complaints, and not-very-veiled threats?

Her very first point in response is to thank him for the opportunity to discuss these matters directly, and she then says that "President Bush, too, wants friendship." Her next point is to tell Saddam that "the President had instructed her to broaden and deepen our relations with Iraq," and she reminds Saddam that though "some circles" might oppose that policy, "the U.S. administration is instructed by the President." And then she adds that "what is important is that the President has very recently reaffirmed his desire for a better relationship" and he has shown that desire by opposing some sanctions bills.

In short, her initial response to Saddam is to try to reassure him of America’s friendly intentions, and to try to convince him that his suspicions are mistaken. It also seems clear that Glaspie is simply following the instructions she had been given.

CONTINUED...

http://foreignpolicy.com/2011/01/09/wikileaks-april-glaspie-and-saddam-hussein/

What Speaker Sam said holds today: "Those who go-along, get along."

And that's why I, too, save the old articles, dreamnightwind. The way things disappear down the Memory Hole, someone has to.