Trump: 'Robert E. Lee was a great general'

[modrepub]

80. I call BS

Lee had two offensive campaigns into Union Territory and he lost both spectacularly. IMO the Gettysburg Campaign really showed Lee's ineptitude, which he himself recognized when he offered to resign after that disaster. Here is a list of his blunders from that campaign that I feel nobody talks about.

No Objective: Lee's strategy was to move north, draw the Army of the Potomac away from the Confederacy and win some pitched battle so that the Union would have to abandon its siege at Vicksburg. Longstreet was overruled by Lee and Davis when he suggested detaching troops from the Army of Northern Virginia to relieve the siege. IMO, Lee should have aggressively moved north towards Harrisburg, captured the northern capital and cut the Pennsylvania Rail Road line. Having no objective from the get go got Lee in trouble when his calvary under Stewart got separated from Lee's army until the second day at Gettysburg.

State of the Army of the Potomac: Keep in mind Lee had just defeated the Army of the Potomac, which was twice the size of his, at Chancellorsville. The Army of the Potomac was reduced in size after the battle since Lincoln had no desire to let Hooker lead if for another battle. Lincoln refused to let Hooker take command of the Union garrison at Harper's Ferry and Hooker resigned. Let that sink in, Lee is already moving into Pennsylvania causing great panic and Lincoln allows the leading general of his largest army to resign. Lincoln decides to nominate Meade right before the most important campaign of the Civil War. To complicate matters, Meade is not the senior general inside the Army of the Potomac; there are two others who are senior to him. Lincoln's logic in selecting Meade was that he was from Pennsylvania (Philadelphia) so he'd be more apt to fight on his own soil and more importantly, Meade had no political aspirations or support. Lucky for Lincoln he chose a very capable officer who thought he was being arrested for criticizing Hooker when they showed up in the middle of the night to tell him he was receiving command of the Army of the Potomac just days before one of the most crucial battles of the Civil War.

Use of Subordinates at Gettysburg: Probably one of the only bright spots for the Union at Chancellorsville was Lee's loss of one of his most capable generals when Jackson was killed (by shots from his own troops). That left Lee with one experienced corp commander, Longstreet. Strangely, Lee kept Longstreet's corp in the rear protecting his army's escape route should disaster happen. That meant that Lee's army would initially come in contact with Union (reserve) units with somewhat inexperienced commanders. Contrast that with Meade who pushed his most experienced general, Reynolds at the head of his army. Reynolds would be killed early on the first day of Gettysburg and Union forces would eventually be routed by superior Confederate numbers. Before Reynolds is killed he sends back a message to Meade that he has engaged Lee's army and he holds a strong position (on Seminary Ridge) at Gettysburg that he thinks the Union can hold. Meade, who has chosen a spot in Maryland to try and engage Lee trusts his subordinate's judgement and begins moving his other corps to Gettysburg. When Meade learns of Reynolds death he is distraught at his fellow Pennsylvanian's death but sends another capable general, Hancock to take charge and assess the situation. Hancock arrives late on the first day as the Union army is streaming out of Gettysburg. He steadies the troops on Cemetery ridge and sends a message back to Meade that he still likes the position. Meade again trusts his subordinate and hurries the final units to Gettysburg, which arrive during the early morning hours of the second day. Perhaps the first day would have gone better for Lee if his most capable general was on the field. Maybe the disaster of Picket's charge would have been avoided if Lee had listened to his subordinate's assessment to go around Meade's strong position. Not having Stewart's calvary until the end of the battled didn't help but again that's on Lee for not having a definitive game plan for the campaign.

Movement During the Battle: Lee was never a corps commander so he tended to stay in his tent rather than go out and assess the situation. He didn't arrive on the battlefield until the second day and wasted most of that day waiting for Longstreet's corp to come over from Chambersburg. Meade had his army in place very early on the second day following the old adage for successful Civil War commanders, move aggressively and fight defensively. The better movement of the Union army's corp probably had two reason's. One was the Union calvary was able to screen Lee's troops allowing the army to move unhindered and trick Lee's corps generals into thinking they were engaging more men than they actually were since calvary fire arms fired at a faster rate then the muzzle loaded infantry units. Second was the Union corps had much fewer troops by design. McClellan had designed Union smaller corps to more easily move along roads. Lee divided his army into three much larger corps, which simplified the command structure but made road movements much more cumbersome. Meade was originally a corps commander and was used to riding in the field and observing his troops. It was during one of these trips that he found General Sickles corp out of position; he was supposed to be on the Round Tops anchoring the army's left flank. When confronted by Meade, Sickles said the ground he had chosen was higher then his previous position. Meade told him that he could find higher ground right up to South Mountain. When Sickles offered to withdraw his troops back to his original position Meade told him that "those men won't let you", a reference to Longstreet's corp which was beginning to engage Sickles out of position corps. Meade's action on this side of the battlefield are never recognized. All the credit for the Union's heroic hold of the Round Tops would go to the commander of the 10th Maine, Joshua Chamberlin. None of this might ever have happened if Meade personally hadn't rode out to inspect this position. There was one stage during this in which Meade and his staff were nearly alone on the round tops as a company of confederates approached the position. Meade calmly drew his sword as his staff nervously did the same. At the last minute a company of Union soldiers showed up and Meade quickly encouraged their placement. Afterwards when one of his staff commented on how bad their previous predicament looked Meade was said to say, "Yes, but it's all right now! It's all right now!"


Sorry for the long rant but I can't stand to hear about how great Lee was as a general. IMO it ranks up there with the State's Rights Civil War fallacy.