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Economy
In reply to the discussion: STOCK MARKET WATCH - Wednesday, 11 January 2012 [View all]Demeter
(85,373 posts)12. Predicting the Euro's Demise: To Those Who Got it Right, We Salute You! By Mitch Green
http://neweconomicperspectives.blogspot.com/2011/11/to-those-who-got-it-right-we-salute-you.html
To many of the world's most highly-regarded economists, the Eurozone's meltdown has come as a major surprise. Committed to the belief that One Market needs One Money, most economists expected the Euro to serve as an important complement to Europe's integration. But, as Cullen Roche at Pragmatic Capitalism has pointed out, those who recognized how the monetary systems actually work saw the writing on the wall, as the seeds of the Euro's own destruction were unwittingly put in place right from the beginning. Wynne Godley was the first to point out that the unprecedented divorce between the Eurozone governments' monetary and fiscal powers would place its members in a fragile position and render them powerless in the face of a crisis. It was a warning that Cullen suggested might amount to "the greatest prediction of the last 20 years." Similar praise came just last week from John Cassidy of The New Yorker magazine, who dedicated an entire piece to Godley's insights, calling him "The Man Who Saw Through the Euro."
In honor of Professor Godley we sought permission to reprint his 1992 article Maaschrict and All That in its entirety. It's a piece that is suddenly getting a lot of attention, as journalists and other commentators search for something, anything to help them understand why things in the Eurozone have unfolded so badly. As one of Britain's most accurate economic forecasters, Wynne was accustomed to getting things right. Many contributors to this blog owe a great deal to Wynne. He taught us to develop stock-flow consistent macro models, emphasizing that every financial flow must 'come from' somewhere and 'go' somewhere and that these flows lead to stock adjustments that affect balance sheets and ultimately the stability of the economic system. Wynne passed away in 2010 but his insights continue to impress. With any luck, those seeking solutions to the present crisis will rediscover his work and learn from the warnings he issued in 1992, before the ink on the Maastricht Treaty had even begun to dry.
To many of the world's most highly-regarded economists, the Eurozone's meltdown has come as a major surprise. Committed to the belief that One Market needs One Money, most economists expected the Euro to serve as an important complement to Europe's integration. But, as Cullen Roche at Pragmatic Capitalism has pointed out, those who recognized how the monetary systems actually work saw the writing on the wall, as the seeds of the Euro's own destruction were unwittingly put in place right from the beginning. Wynne Godley was the first to point out that the unprecedented divorce between the Eurozone governments' monetary and fiscal powers would place its members in a fragile position and render them powerless in the face of a crisis. It was a warning that Cullen suggested might amount to "the greatest prediction of the last 20 years." Similar praise came just last week from John Cassidy of The New Yorker magazine, who dedicated an entire piece to Godley's insights, calling him "The Man Who Saw Through the Euro."
In honor of Professor Godley we sought permission to reprint his 1992 article Maaschrict and All That in its entirety. It's a piece that is suddenly getting a lot of attention, as journalists and other commentators search for something, anything to help them understand why things in the Eurozone have unfolded so badly. As one of Britain's most accurate economic forecasters, Wynne was accustomed to getting things right. Many contributors to this blog owe a great deal to Wynne. He taught us to develop stock-flow consistent macro models, emphasizing that every financial flow must 'come from' somewhere and 'go' somewhere and that these flows lead to stock adjustments that affect balance sheets and ultimately the stability of the economic system. Wynne passed away in 2010 but his insights continue to impress. With any luck, those seeking solutions to the present crisis will rediscover his work and learn from the warnings he issued in 1992, before the ink on the Maastricht Treaty had even begun to dry.
A lot of people throughout Europe have suddenly realised that they know hardly anything about the Maastricht Treaty while rightly sensing that it could make a huge difference to their lives. Their legitimate anxiety has provoked Jacques Delors to make a statement to the effect that the views of ordinary people should in future be more sensitively consulted. He might have thought of that before.
Although I support the move towards political integration in Europe, I think that the Maastricht proposals as they stand are seriously defective, and also that public discussion of them has been curiously impoverished. With a Danish rejection, a near-miss in France, and the very existence of the ERM in question after the depredations by currency markets, it is a good moment to take stock.
The central idea of the Maastricht Treaty is that the EC countries should move towards an economic and monetary union, with a single currency managed by an independent central bank. But how is the rest of economic policy to be run? As the treaty proposes no new institutions other than a European bank, its sponsors must suppose that nothing more is needed. But this could only be correct if modern economies were self-adjusting systems that didnt need any management at all.
I am driven to the conclusion that such a view that economies are self-righting organisms which never under any circumstances need management at all did indeed determine the way in which the Maastricht Treaty was framed. It is a crude and extreme version of the view which for some time now has constituted Europes conventional wisdom (though not that of the US or Japan) that governments are unable, and therefore should not try, to achieve any of the traditional goals of economic policy, such as growth and full employment. All that can legitimately be done, according to this view, is to control the money supply and balance the budget. It took a group largely composed of bankers (the Delors Committee) to reach the conclusion that an independent central bank was the only supra-national institution necessary to run an integrated, supra-national Europe.
But there is much more to it all. It needs to be emphasised at the start that the establishment of a single currency in the EC would indeed bring to an end the sovereignty of its component nations and their power to take independent action on major issues. As Mr Tim Congdon has argued very cogently, the power to issue its own money, to make drafts on its own central bank, is the main thing which defines national independence. If a country gives up or loses this power, it acquires the status of a local authority or colony. Local authorities and regions obviously cannot devalue. But they also lose the power to finance deficits through money creation while other methods of raising finance are subject to central regulation. Nor can they change interest rates. As local authorities possess none of the instruments of macro-economic policy, their political choice is confined to relatively minor matters of emphasis a bit more education here, a bit less infrastructure there. I think that when Jacques Delors lays new emphasis on the principle of subsidiarity, he is really only telling us we will be allowed to make decisions about a larger number of relatively unimportant matters than we might previously have supposed. Perhaps he will let us have curly cucumbers after all. Big deal!
MUCH MORE AT LINK
Although I support the move towards political integration in Europe, I think that the Maastricht proposals as they stand are seriously defective, and also that public discussion of them has been curiously impoverished. With a Danish rejection, a near-miss in France, and the very existence of the ERM in question after the depredations by currency markets, it is a good moment to take stock.
The central idea of the Maastricht Treaty is that the EC countries should move towards an economic and monetary union, with a single currency managed by an independent central bank. But how is the rest of economic policy to be run? As the treaty proposes no new institutions other than a European bank, its sponsors must suppose that nothing more is needed. But this could only be correct if modern economies were self-adjusting systems that didnt need any management at all.
I am driven to the conclusion that such a view that economies are self-righting organisms which never under any circumstances need management at all did indeed determine the way in which the Maastricht Treaty was framed. It is a crude and extreme version of the view which for some time now has constituted Europes conventional wisdom (though not that of the US or Japan) that governments are unable, and therefore should not try, to achieve any of the traditional goals of economic policy, such as growth and full employment. All that can legitimately be done, according to this view, is to control the money supply and balance the budget. It took a group largely composed of bankers (the Delors Committee) to reach the conclusion that an independent central bank was the only supra-national institution necessary to run an integrated, supra-national Europe.
But there is much more to it all. It needs to be emphasised at the start that the establishment of a single currency in the EC would indeed bring to an end the sovereignty of its component nations and their power to take independent action on major issues. As Mr Tim Congdon has argued very cogently, the power to issue its own money, to make drafts on its own central bank, is the main thing which defines national independence. If a country gives up or loses this power, it acquires the status of a local authority or colony. Local authorities and regions obviously cannot devalue. But they also lose the power to finance deficits through money creation while other methods of raising finance are subject to central regulation. Nor can they change interest rates. As local authorities possess none of the instruments of macro-economic policy, their political choice is confined to relatively minor matters of emphasis a bit more education here, a bit less infrastructure there. I think that when Jacques Delors lays new emphasis on the principle of subsidiarity, he is really only telling us we will be allowed to make decisions about a larger number of relatively unimportant matters than we might previously have supposed. Perhaps he will let us have curly cucumbers after all. Big deal!
MUCH MORE AT LINK
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i'm glad it's better today -- but yeesh -- that's awful to have to go through that. nt
xchrom
Jan 2012
#59
How I Stopped Worrying and Learned to Love the OWS Protests MATT TIABBI MUST READ
Demeter
Jan 2012
#8
Predicting the Euro's Demise: To Those Who Got it Right, We Salute You! By Mitch Green
Demeter
Jan 2012
#12
I disgree. The infection mutated, widely, amongst the "chosen" few doing "gods' work", whatever the
Ghost Dog
Jan 2012
#65